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A Red Flag for Hong Kong Credit Ratings 
 
 
Syren Johnstone* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract** 
  
In July 2011 Moody's Investors Service Hong Kong issued a report that used a 
system of red flags to highlight corporate governance and accounting risks in a 
specified population of listed companies. Although Moody’s did not consider the 
report a credit rating, the Securities and Futures Commission, and the Securities 
and Futures Appeals Tribunal in its March 2016 determination, regarded the 
issuance of it as part of Moody’s regulated activity as a provider of credit rating 
services. As such, Moody's was held subject to regulatory codes of conduct it was 
said to have breached, and was consequently disciplined. Moody's has since 
appealed that determination, which will bring the case before the Court of Appeal. 
 
This paper undertakes a detailed legal analysis of the Tribunal’s determination. It 
suggests the Tribunal’s purposive approach to legislative interpretation is flawed, 
and its determination impaired by the way the Tribunal has framed the syntax of 
its reasoning and has conflated important distinctions between credit 
risk, creditworthiness, credit ratings and the methodology used to produce a 
rating opinion. Other legislative provisions relevant to the publication of 
information are reviewed and it is noted there is no lacuna in Hong Kong’s law 
that would necessitate the approach taken by the Tribunal to address the 
perceived wrongdoing. Whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of the law is 
necessary or consistent with the policy intent of the Legislature is queried.  
 
The ramifications of a Court of law upholding the Tribunal’s determination are 
considered. Locally this includes blurring the perimeter around regulated and 
unregulated activities and the possible creation of an uneven playing field. Of 
particular significance for Hong Kong’s credit rating industry, it may create 
uncertainties as to whether Hong Kong would remain an equivalent jurisdiction 
for the purposes of recognition under European Union regulations. The paper 
concludes with a brief consideration of the regulatory approach to managing the 
introduction of a new regulatory regime.  
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Executive summary 
 
The regulatory oversight of credit rating agencies (“CRAs”) introduced in Hong 
Kong in June 2011 has recently been the subject of a determination made by the 
Securities and Futures Appeals Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) that is now on its way to 
an appeal before the Hong Kong Court of Appeal. The case concerns whether the 
issue of a report by Moody's Investors Service Hong Kong Limited (“Moody’s”) 
constituted a credit rating and the provision of credit rating services, matters 
governed by the Securities and Futures Ordinance (“SFO”). The Tribunal 
determined that it did, rendering the issue of Moody’s report subject to the 
requirements of non-statutory regulations issued by the Securities and Futures 
Commission (“SFC”). 
 
The case is of particular interest for a number of reasons. It represents the first 
time since the development of an international approach to CRA regulatory 
oversight that the precise scope of a credit rating regulatory regime falls to be 
determined. Specifically, whether or not publishing an item of information 
constitutes credit rating activity for regulatory purposes. As such, it also 
represents an exploration of what reports issued by a CRA should be regarded as 
falling within the perimeter of its regulated activities. Locally, it represents the 
first time a substantive determination of the Tribunal has been appealed since its 
establishment under the SFO in 2003.  
 
This paper analyzes the determination made by the Tribunal and the potential 
implications locally and internationally should the Court of Appeal uphold its 
determination. 
 
The introduction of a CRA regulatory regime in Hong Kong is a result of 
international considerations, as discussed in Section 1 of this paper. The 
international community began to focus on the role of CRAs from around 2003 
when work undertaken by the Financial Stability Board and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) led to IOSCO’s report, and 
subsequent statement of principles, on CRA activities. This was followed by a 
consensus post the 2008 global financial crisis that CRAs should be brought under 
regulatory oversight with various countries in turn implementing CRA regimes. 
Hong Kong modeled its regime on the principles and code issued by IOSCO, and 
with a view to ensuring ratings issued by CRAs based in Hong Kong would be 
serviceable in the EU in accordance with EU regulations. 
 
Moody’s report was issued less than six weeks after the CRA regime commenced 
in Hong Kong. It comprised a framework in which red flags were assigned to 
specified Mainland China companies across a range of corporate governance and 
accounting risk issues. Based on the effects of the report in the market, it 
appeared to be of considerable interest to both equity and debt investors. The 
prevailing environment of concern of regulators and investors over governance 
and accounting standards in Mainland companies, the targeted nature of the 
report, the cautionary note of its red flags, and Moody’s status in the market, 
together contributed to this. 
 
Although Moody’s is licensed to engage in the provision of credit rating services 
(Type 10 regulated activity), it did not itself consider the report to be a credit 
rating or part of its Type 10 activities. The SFC, and subsequently the Tribunal, 
took a different view, namely, that the issuance of the report did fall within the 
SFC’s regulatory oversight of Moody’s activities qua its Type 10 licensed 
activities. As such, that brings the report and Moody’s issuance of it within the 
jurisdiction of the SFC and renders it subject to SFC codes of conduct. The SFC 
alleged the report was defective in view of certain code requirements. The 
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sanctions applied by the SFC and disputed by Moody’s arise from alleged 
breaches of those non-statutory regulatory codes, not the law. However, the 
question of whether or not Moody’s issuance of the report is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the SFC is a matter of statutory law, not the non-statutory 
regulations. Section 2 discusses Moody’s report and introduces the Tribunal’s 
determination. 
 
The SFO provides the statutory basis of the CRA regime. Its definition of Type 10 
regulated activity requires the preparation of “credit ratings”, a term defined by 
the SFO. One starting point for assessing whether the issuance of the report 
constituted the provision of a credit rating would therefore be to examine the 
meaning of “credit rating” and apply it to the report. The analysis undertaken in 
Section 4 of this paper suggests the report does not satisfy the basic 
requirements of the statutory language to be a credit rating: (1) the report does 
discuss matters pertaining to credit risk but does not appear to be primarily 
concerned with creditworthiness; (2) the red flag framework can be regarded as a 
defined ranking system but lacks both the ordinality normally required of credit 
ratings and the ability to be used to meaningfully signify creditworthiness; (3) the 
language of the report on a plain reading appears to eschew a connection 
between the red flag framework and creditworthiness; and (4) the factors 
examined by the report may share commonalities with factors relevant to 
methodologies used by CRAs but no opinion on creditworthiness appears to have 
been expressed. Taken together, the foregoing does not point to a credit rating 
that is a defective one - it points to a report that is not a credit rating. 
 
The Tribunal did not assume the above starting point. It undertook a purposive 
interpretation of the law with a view to giving effect to the intention of the 
Legislature. That approach took as its focus the regulated activity of providing 
credit rating services. The analysis undertaken in Section 3 of this paper suggests 
the Tribunal’s purposive approach may be flawed insofar as it does not 
adequately take into account the wider context and purpose of introducing CRA 
regulation in Hong Kong, nor other relevant provisions of the legislation. An 
important component of the Tribunal’s approach was to look outside the four 
sides of the report, namely, Moody’s intent in issuing the report, the reaction of 
the market to the report, and a press release issued the same day as the report. 
However, the CRA legislation makes no provision to consider such extrinsic 
matters, which notably stands in contrast to other provisions of the SFO that seek 
to attain similar objectives such as the quality of information in a market place 
and a clear delineation of regulated and unregulated activities. Following the 
established approach taken by the Court of Final Appeal, most recently in Pacific 
Sun Advisors Ltd and Another v. Securities and Futures Commission [2015] 
HKCFA 27, this discrepancy may indicate the Legislature did not intend extrinsic 
factors to be taken into account when determining the scope of the CRA regime – 
where they have wished this to be the case they have expressed it in the 
legislation. Considering extrinsic matters therefore may be outside the remit of 
what appears to have been intended by the Legislature.  
 
The Tribunal’s purposive approach also encompasses the SFC’s statutory powers 
to impose disciplinary action on regulated intermediaries. The analysis in Section 
3.3 suggests the Tribunal’s approach is based on a broad and unclearly justified 
interpretation of the reach of those powers. By default, it extends the regulatory 
jurisdiction of the SFC to an uncertain category of acts “related to” regulated 
activities. However, it is notable that the SFC’s codes, made for the purpose of 
giving guidance as to the carrying on of regulated activities, do not appear to 
carry such a wide remit that they address activities that are not themselves 
regulated – there would be no legislative basis for the codes to do so. The 
Tribunal’s broad approach to the exercise of statutory powers creates a number 
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of problems including the potential creation of an uneven playing field between 
regulated and unregulated persons engaging in the same act. It is unclear 
whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of the law furthers or in fact hinders the 
legislative purpose. 
 
Putting aside the foregoing considerations, an assessment of the import 
attributed by the Tribunal to the press release issued by Moody’s the same day as 
the report is considered in Section 5 of this paper. The Tribunal suggests that the 
press release, and its reference to the report being “supplemental to Moody's 
methodological approach to rating”, is part of the means by which the report is 
conceived as amplifying, and becomes part of, Moody’s credit ratings. However, 
the Tribunal’s reading of these words in the press release appears stretched if not 
wholly unwarranted. For example, that the press release statement refers to 
Moody’s methodological approach not, as the Tribunal has read it, to its ratings 
per se reflects a confused appreciation of the distinctions and relationships 
between methodology, the ranking system used, and the opinion expressed. As 
such, the Tribunal does not recognize, as the Court did in Bathurst Regional 
Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200, 
that a rating once given is not dependent on a CRA’s subsequent explanation of 
how it reached the rating. The understanding in Bathurst is consistent with the 
SFC’s code of conduct, which requires an explanatory press release to be issued 
when a credit rating is issued or revised but which also implicitly recognizes that 
ratings and explanations of them remain distinct items attending different 
purposes. Moreover, the Tribunal’s treatment of the press release is at odds with 
a more straightforward understanding of the press release (and to some extent 
the report itself) consistent with a commercial entity that wishes to highlight 
matters of potential interest to its primary client base.  
 
The link between the report and credit rating services asserted by the Tribunal is 
tenuous at best, and appears based on an analysis that is in some ways back-to-
front. It is noteworthy that the Tribunal did not undertake a detailed account of 
the specific language used by Hong Kong’s Legislature when defining the term 
“credit rating” but merely regarded the term as broadly defined. While the 
Tribunal correctly notes the definition of “credit rating” is not concerned with the 
specific accountancy directives or mathematical formulae involved in producing a 
rating, its subsequent approach appears to conflate important distinctions and 
relationships between methodology and a rating opinion, and between elements 
of credit risk, creditworthiness and a credit rating. The approach taken in Hong 
Kong’s legislation is consistent with the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions’ definition of a credit rating as an assessment regarding 
creditworthiness that is expressed using a defined and established ranking 
system. However, this cannot be reversed into an understanding that credit 
ratings are assessments of credit risk that produce a defined ranking system. 
 
There is obviously an enormous volume of published materials discussing the 
shortcomings of corporates that may be relevant to assessments of 
creditworthiness but which are not considered to be discussions of risk of default. 
They are instead characterized as, for example, research reports, business 
analyses, or perhaps discussions of corporate sustainability. Default may be a 
potential consequence of bad risk governance, but a discussion of bad risk 
governance, even if based around a ranking system, does not necessarily amount 
to an assessment of the risk of default. The SFC itself uses indicators such as loss 
making companies, frequent corporate restructuring and changes of auditors to 
assess corporate risk and to identify red flags. Such regulatory concerns are 
confluent with the interests of investors generally in the same way that well-
targeted research discussing governance and accounting risks can help to reduce 
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information asymmetries in the market without being rendered a discussion 
primarily regarding creditworthiness.	  
 
The analysis undertaken in this paper suggests the scope of “credit rating” and 
“providing credit rating services” is in fact subject to well-defined parameters in 
the SFO in which certain matters are to be considered to the exclusion of other 
considerations. These considerations raise significant doubts over the correctness 
of the Tribunal’s determination. It is suggested that the Tribunal has, in effect, 
adopted the wrong starting point for its analysis. It is not consistent with either 
development of the CRA regulatory regime or the architecture of the SFO to 
frame an investigation into whether or not a credit rating has been issued by 
looking to the issuer’s licensed status to determine the nature of a report it 
issues. Nor is it appropriate to selectively look at acts and consequences from a 
remedial point of view without considering other remedial provisions of the SFO 
that are arguably more clearly relevant to the alleged wrongdoing. 
 
Although the Tribunal’s determination is incapable of affecting the law it is 
nevertheless highly influential as to how the SFC goes about executing its 
regulatory function as well as the undertakings of regulated persons. However, 
when the Court of Appeal rules on Moody’s appeal, law is established. Section 6 
of this paper considers the implications of the Tribunal’s determination should it 
be upheld in the Court of Appeal, in particular, whether it may be 
counterproductive to the policy intent of the Legislature. It is suggested that 
important purposes of the legislation and the introduction of CRA regulation in 
Hong Kong may be called into question. Locally, this includes (1) greater 
uncertainty as to what constitutes the regulated activity of providing credit rating 
services, (2) what reports of a CRA are to be regarded as subject to the SFC’s 
regulatory oversight, (3) the creation of an uneven playing field for regulated as 
compared to unregulated persons, and (4) the potential impact on information 
asymmetry in the market as a consequence of widening a CRA’s liability.  
 
Internationally, and of particular significance for Hong Kong’s credit rating 
industry, it may create uncertainties as to whether Hong Kong would remain an 
equivalent jurisdiction for the purposes of recognition under EU regulations, which 
is essential for ratings issued by Hong Kong licensed CRAs to be serviceable in 
the EU. As the SFC’s case against Moody’s is fundamentally based on the quality 
of information in the report, other relevant sections of the SFO that are 
concerned with information are reviewed and it is noted there is no lacuna in 
Hong Kong’s legislation in this regard that would necessitate the approach taken 
by the Tribunal to address the perceived wrongdoing. 
 
Any analysis of information connected to the CRA industry must be astute to 
important differences between elements of credit risk, the concept of 
creditworthiness, and the opinion that might be expressed on creditworthiness. 
Although the application of methodology gives rise to the formation of a rating 
opinion, it is divorced from the opinion once the opinion is expressed. It is also 
well accepted that not all information issued by CRAs constitute credit ratings. 
Conflating these distinctions leads to a muddled understanding of the CRA’s 
undertaking, a confused approach to the statutorily defined term “credit rating”, 
and consequential errors of analysis.  
 
Given that (1) the definitions of “credit rating” and Type 10 regulated activity are 
clearly expressed and as such appear to serve their regulatory purposes, (2) 
other provisions of the SFO adequately address the problem of misleading 
information entering the market, and (3) the potential problems attendant on the 
Tribunal’s approach, there does not appear to be any good reason to broaden the 
scope of the credit rating regime in the way undertaken by the Tribunal. 
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Accordingly, the primary conclusion, discussed in Section 7 of this paper, is that 
the issue of the report and the red flag framework in it should not be regarded as 
constituting Type 10 regulated activity or a credit rating as such terms are 
defined by the law. 
 
Taking a broader perspective on the Moody’s case, it is noteworthy that at the 
time Moody’s issued the report the CRA regulatory regime was only 41 days old, 
subject to some uncertainties as to how the SFC’s general code of conduct would 
apply to CRAs in certain regards, and that the topic of the global financial crisis of 
2008 and the role of CRAs in it was still a recent and sensitive issue. The SFC’s 
approach to the report, electing to pursue Moody’s publicly under the CRA 
regime, is in some ways puzzling when one considers (1) the newness of the CRA 
regime, (2) that it required treating the issuance of the report as being clearly 
part of Moody’s credit rating services and not merely a research report falling 
under a CRA’s other business analysis activities, (3) that no breaches were 
alleged of the SFC’s code that specifically deals with CRA activities (the Code of 
Conduct for Persons Providing Credit Rating Services) and (4) the alternative 
approaches available to the SFC (assuming for this purpose the SFC’s perception 
of the report). As noted in Section 8 of this paper, the SFC have a range of tools 
at their disposal for dealing with a perceived shortfall in standards, particularly 
where that involves information going into the market that it considers to be 
misleading. This may range from exercising its regulatory power to discipline, 
such as by way of private sanction, to bringing an action under the market 
misconduct provisions of the SFO.  
 
Effective regulation frequently comprises an element of seeking the right balance 
and making assessments as to the gravity of a perceived wrongdoing.  Moody’s 
report was not free from errors and uncertainties. Nevertheless, putting aside the 
analysis presented in this paper, one can ask whether there was an alternative 
case for a more nuanced approach to managing the introduction of a new 
regulatory regime and effectively bringing an existing and well-established 
industry within the SFC’s oversight. Or, to put it another way, what is the best 
way of developing a strategic partnership between regulator and a population of 
regulatees that serves to foster market standards? 	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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The regulatory oversight of credit rating agencies 
 
Credit rating agencies (“CRAs”) have largely operated in an unregulated 
environment since their development out of mercantile credit agencies in the mid 
nineteenth century.1 While credit ratings first became recognized for regulatory 
purposes in the 1930s in the United States (“U.S.”), CRAs were not themselves 
subject to regulatory oversight until 1975 when the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) introduced the nationally recognized statistical 
rating organization (“NRSRO”) designation, although the extent of the regulatory 
oversight was limited in scope and specific in purpose.2  
 
In the early 2000’s, prompted by high profile corporate collapses, the 
international community began to look more closely at the role of CRAs in the 
financial marketplace, and consequently whether they should be subject to 
regulatory oversight. Work undertaken by the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) 
and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) led to 
IOSCO issuing two documents3 in 2003 concerning the activities of CRAs and the 
high-level principles that should govern them. Both papers emphasized the 
importance of ratings issued by CRAs in reducing information asymmetries in the 
market and took to task the means by which this objective can be promoted and 
protected, namely, by mechanisms that addressed matters such as conflicts of 
interest and transparency that could impact on the independence and objectivity 
of the ratings. In 2004 IOSCO published its “Code of conduct fundamentals for 
credit rating agencies” (“IOSCO CRA Code”).4 Taken together, these documents 
established, for the first time, a basis for an international standard to the 
regulation of CRAs. However, CRAs at this time remained self-regulated. 
 
It was not until the global financial crisis of 2008 that there was an international 
consensus that CRAs should be brought under regulatory oversight.5 In 
September 2009 the European Union (“EU”) issued a regulation on CRAs the 
purpose of which was, inter alia: 
 
“to enhance the integrity, transparency, responsibility, good governance 
and reliability of credit rating activities … [and to lay down] conditions for 
the issuing of credit ratings”.6 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See generally: DW Arner et al, “Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in Hong Kong: Lessons 
from the Global Financial Crisis” Banking & Finance Law Review 25.3 (June 2010), 361-
403, page 363; Herwig M. Langohr and Patricia T. Langohr, “The Rating Agencies and their 
Credit Ratings: What They Are, How They Work and Why They Are Relevant”, 2008 John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd, pages 1-2; A Duff and S Einig “Credit rating agencies: meeting the 
needs of the market?”, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 2007, Chapter 
2 
2 DW Arner et al, “Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in Hong Kong: Lessons from the 
Global Financial Crisis” Banking & Finance Law Review 25.3 (June 2010), 361-403, page 
363 
3 “Report on the activities of credit rating agencies”, and “IOSCO Statement Of Principles 
Regarding The Activities Of Credit Rating Agencies”, both issued in September 2003 
4 The IOSCO CRA Code is updated from time to time, the current version being dated 
March 2015. See IOSCO FR05/2015  
5 "Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy", and the "The Global 
Plan for Recovery and Reform, London" - statements issued by the G20 leaders, 15 
November 2008 and 2 April 2009, respectively 
6 Article 1, Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies 
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The effect of the EU regulation was to establish, from 7 June 2011, three 
gateways that permitted the use of credit ratings in the EU for the purpose of 
complying with EU laws and regulations: (1) ratings issued directly under the EU 
regulation, (2) ratings endorsed by CRAs regulated under the EU regime as 
complying with requirements as stringent as in the EU, and (3) ratings issued 
under an equivalent regulatory regime.  
 
1.2 The position in Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong’s implementation of a CRA regime closely followed the approach taken 
internationally post 2008. The SFC’s consultation paper initiating the legislative 
changes references7 the Group of Twenty (“G20”) “Declaration on strengthening 
the financial system – London, 2 April 2009”, which required that “all Credit 
Rating Agencies whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes should be subject 
to a regulatory oversight regime.” 
 
The SFC considered the international developments, particularly the U.S. and the 
EU, important to ensure “that the regime under which CRAs will be regulated in 
Hong Kong is generally consistent with the relatively uniform approach to 
regulation that appears to be developing internationally”.8 With a view to 
ensuring that credit ratings issued by CRAs based in Hong Kong were serviceable 
in the EU, Hong Kong implemented its regulatory regime to meet the EU’s test of 
equivalence and/or stringency.9 
 
Hong Kong’s CRA regime became effective on 1 June 2011.10 It consisted of 
amendments to the primary legislation governing the securities industry, the 
Securities and Futures Ordinance cap 571 (“SFO”), that introduced a definition of 
“credit rating” and added, to the nine already in place, a new regulated activity, 
“Type 10: providing credit rating services”. In addition, the Securities and Futures 
Commission (“SFC”) issued the “Code of Conduct for Persons Providing Credit 
Rating Services” (“SFC CRA Code”),11 a non-statutory regulatory code concerned 
with the conduct of CRAs that supplements its more general “Code of Conduct for 
Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission” 
(“SFC General Code”). The SFC CRA Code expressly states that it “is based on” 
the IOSCO CRA Code.12 
 
The CRA regime is in some ways distinct within the overall framework of the SFO. 
A primary concern of the SFO is the transactions, agreements, recommendations 
and information arising in relation to listed securities (both debt and equity). This 
may be contrasted with the CRA regime, which is concerned with the concept of 
the creditworthiness of corporate bodies (whether or not listed), debt securities of 
public companies (whether or not the debt is listed and excluding their equity 
securities), and agreements to provide credit. 
 
On 28 April 2014 the European Commission issued its implementing decision by 
which it recognized the legal and supervisory framework of Hong Kong as being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 SFC’s “Consultation Paper Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, 19 July 2010, para 3 
8 SFC’s “Consultation Conclusions Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, 29 October 2010, para 4 
9 “Consultation Conclusions Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, Securities and Futures Commission, 29 October 2010, para 4 
10 Securities and futures Ordinance (Amendment of Schedule 5) Notice, L.N. 28 of 2011 
11 June 2011 
12 SFC CRA Code, para 2, referring to the IOSCO CRA Code in effect at that time. 
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equivalent to the EU regulations.13 The decision is subject to three conditions, the 
first of which requires that CRAs: 
 
“must be subject to authorisation or registration and to effective 
supervision and enforcement on an ongoing basis … On this basis, it 
should be considered that CRAs in Hong Kong are subject to authorisation 
or registration requirements equivalent to those laid down in Regulation 
(EC) No 1060/2009 and the Hong Kong supervisory and enforcement 
arrangements applicable to CRAs are effectively applied and enforced.” 
(emphasis added).14 
 
Obtaining the equivalence decision is therefore not a one-off passport but an 
ongoing obligation requiring the conditions to be maintained on an ongoing basis. 
In this regard, IOSCO has observed the need for supervisors to monitor the 
effectiveness of their CRA regime and any conflicts that may arise in the CRA 
regimes between different jurisdictions.15 These requirements shall become 
relevant to consider at a later stage of this paper.16 
 
1.3 The Moody’s case in Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong’s CRA regime, particularly the scope of “credit rating” and “providing 
credit rating services”, has recently been the subject of close regulatory 
examination. 
 
On 11 July 2011, less than 6 weeks after the introduction of the CRA regulatory 
regime in Hong Kong, Moody's Investors Service Hong Kong Limited (“Moody’s”) 
published a report, the “Red Flags for Emerging-Market Companies: A Focus on 
China” (the “RF Report”). Although Moody’s itself did not regard the RF Report as 
being a credit rating, the SFC did regard it as such and imposed regulatory 
penalties on Moody’s in respect of alleged regulatory breaches.  
 
Moody’s appealed the matter to the Securities and Futures Appeals Tribunal (the 
“Tribunal”), a statutory body17 charged with hearing appeals in respect of certain 
decisions of the SFC. The Tribunal concurred with the SFC’s view that the issue of 
the RF Report constituted a credit rating.18 The RF Report and the Tribunal’s 
determination are introduced in Section 2. 
 
Although the powers of the Tribunal are considerable, including certain powers 
that a Court of law does not possess,19 its determination is technically incapable 
of affecting the law as a result of the nature of the Tribunal insofar as it is not a 
Court of law. Nevertheless, its role in Hong Kong’s regulatory architecture gives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Specifically, Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on credit rating agencies. See Official Journal of the European Union, vol 57, 3 May 
2014, page 76-78. The decision came into effect on 23 May 2014 
14 Official Journal of the European Union, vol 57, 3 May 2014, page 76-77 
15 IOSCO “Regulatory Implementation of the Statement of Principles Regarding the 
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies - Final Report” FR04/11 February 2011, page 38 
16 See Section 6.1.2 
17 Established under Part XI of the SFO 
18 Moody's Investors Service Hong Kong Limited and Securities and Futures Commission, 
Application No. 4 of 2014; date of determination 31 March 2016. See 
http://www.sfat.gov.hk/english/determination/AN-4-2014-Determination.pdf 
19 See section 219 of the SFO. For example, to receive evidence not admissible in a court 
of law and to compel evidence. The Tribunal has the same powers as the Court of First 
Instance to punish for contempt and may also register its orders with the Court of First 
Instance, under sections 221 and 226 of the SFO respectively. 
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its determination significant weight and serves as guidance to both the industry 
and SFC. 
 
Moody’s has appealed the Tribunal’s determination. Under Hong Kong’s 
regulatory architecture, this will bring the case before the Court of Appeal,20 a 
body that is able to set legal precedent regarding the interpretation of terms 
defined by statute. The case before the Court is of considerable interest for a 
number of reasons. 
 
It will be the first case heard against a regulated CRA in Hong Kong, and also the 
first time a determination of the Tribunal has been appealed under the appeal 
mechanism established when the SFO was introduced in 2003. 
 
Of greater relevance to the purposes of this paper, it will also be the first 
occasion in which a Court of law in Hong Kong or internationally21 has had to 
consider the precise scope of the term “credit rating”.  
 
An issue of no less importance will be the impact of the Court’s ruling on 
information providers in the market, and the positioning of Hong Kong in the 
international CRA context. There is a broad industry and international consensus 
on what credit ratings are and are not. Different jurisdictions have provided for 
similar, though not identical, definitions of “credit rating”. Aligning the meaning 
and scope of the term is important given the sought-after consistency in the 
international approach to CRA regulation. The alignment of Hong Kong’s statutory 
use of the term with international expectations, fundamental to the origins of CRA 
regulation in Hong Kong,22 is of particular relevance in view of the condition 
attached to the EU decision cited above, as will be discussed in Section 6. 
 
In sum, the case has the potential to establish important boundary lines for the 
CRA industry domestically and internationally as well as for information flowing 
into the market more generally - what material should be regarded as research 
product and what falls to be treated under the special category of ‘credit rating’. 
 
1.4 Structure of this paper 
 
Section 2 of this paper provides an overview of the issue of the RF Report, the 
applicable regulatory context, and the subsequent regulatory actions taken. The 
Tribunal’s determination is outlined for more detailed consideration in subsequent 
sections. 
 
Sections 3 to 5 comprise a detailed analysis of the Tribunal’s determination, 
dealing with, in sequence, the purposive approach undertaken by the Tribunal, 
the means by which the Tribunal has construed the issuance of the RF Report as 
a credit rating and/or the provision of credit rating services, and the role of the 
press release issued the day the RF Report was issued. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Part XI, Division 3 of the SFO 
21 Searches were conducted using Lexis in Hong Kong, the UK, all EU member states, US 
Federal courts, Canada and Australia. However, two cases of interest for other reasons 
were identified and these are discussed elsewhere in this paper, namely, Bathurst Regional 
Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) 3 of 6 (2012) and General 
Electric Capital Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2009] T.C.J. No. 489 (Tax Court appeal). 
22 I.e. the desire to achieve a “relatively uniform approach” (SFC’s “Consultation Paper 
Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies” 19 July 2010, para 4) with 
that taken internationally. See also para 7 of the SFC’s “Consultation Conclusions 
Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies” 29 October 2010 
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Section 6 considers the implications of the Tribunal’s determination should it be 
upheld in the Court of Appeal, in particular, whether it may be counterproductive 
to the policy intent of the Legislature. 
 
Sections 7 and 8 conclude. 
 
2.  THE HONG KONG CASE 
 
2.1 The RF Report 
 
The RF Report was issued as a paid-for product, however, it quickly became 
freely available in the market.23 It comprised a framework in which red flags were 
assigned to specified companies across a range of corporate governance and 
accounting risk issues. The framework comprised 20 red flags grouped into five 
categories that are described as “screens for governance or accounting risks 
[that] can help identify areas to investigate but cannot serve as mechanisms to 
rank order credit risk.”24, The categories, explained in an appendix to the report, 
are: 
 
weaknesses in corporate governance; 
riskier or more opaque business models; 
fast-growing-business strategies; 
poorer quality of earnings or cash flow; and 
concerns over auditors and quality of financial statements. 
 
The RF Report describes the system as identifying “warning signs” for the types 
of companies covered, being 61 Chinese non-financial companies that fall within 
Moody’s ratings horizon as being “high-yield”.25 
 
A summary of how many red flags were raised on a category-by-category basis 
against each company’s credit rating. The report noted in several places that 
there was “limited correlation”26 between the number of red flags and the credit 
ratings that had been assigned to the companies under Moody’s existing ratings, 
which ranged from Ba1 to Caa2. 
 
Six of the companies, that had triggered between 7 and 12 red flags, were 
identified as “negative outliers”27 and were subject to additional comments as to 
“what risks these flags are highlighting.”28 The RF Report does not explain why 
these companies were identified as negative outliers when other companies also 
triggered the same number of flags. 
 
2.2 The regulatory context 
 
Moody’s holds a Type 10 license (providing credit rating services). That regulated 
activity is defined as meaning: 
 
“(a) preparing credit ratings- 
(i) for dissemination to the public, whether in Hong Kong or 
elsewhere; or (ii) with a reasonable expectation that they will be so 
disseminated; or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The RF Report can be found on the internet by searching for it.  
24 RF Report page 1 
25 RF Report page 2 
26 RF Report pages 1 and 4 
27 RF Report pages 14-15 of Appendix 2 
28 RF Report page 4 
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(b) preparing credit ratings- 
(i) for distribution by subscription, whether in Hong Kong or 
elsewhere; or (ii) with a reasonable expectation that they will be so 
distributed” (emphasis added)29 
 
As such, when Moody’s engages in Type 10 regulated activity it is subject to SFC 
General Code and the SFC CRA Code. Both codes are concerned with conduct 
matters. The latter code, which is based on the IOSCO CRA Code,30 is specifically 
concerned with matters covering CRAs including the rating process, independence 
and conflicts of interest including the undertaking of ancillary services, and the 
responsibilities of a CRA to the investing public and rated entities. 
 
Under the foregoing definition, the question of whether a person engages in Type 
10 regulated activity turns on the question of whether or not the information 
disseminated is or is not a “credit rating”, defined by the SFO as meaning: 
 
“opinions, expressed using a defined ranking system, primarily regarding 
the creditworthiness of- (a) a person other than an individual; (b) debt 
securities; (c) preferred securities; or (d) an agreement to provide 
credit”31 
 
This definition will be examined in closer detail in Sections 3 and 4 of this paper. 
For present purposes it is sufficient to note that if the RF Report is a credit rating, 
then it is clear that Moody’s when issuing it was engaging in Type 10 regulated 
activity. If it is not, then, on a straightforward reading of the ordinance, whatever 
activity it might be regarded as, it would appear not to be Type 10 regulated 
activity. 
 
2.3 The SFC’s position 
 
The SFC regarded the issue of the RF Report as subject to its regulatory 
jurisdiction. This was because either (1) the RF Report was itself a credit rating so 
that when Moody’s issued it, it was engaging in Type 10 regulated activity, or (2) 
if not, the issue of the RF Report was so “closely attendant upon [Moody’s Type 
10 activities that it] must be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the SFC.”32 
 
As such, the issuance of the RF Report would be subject to both the SFC CRA 
Code and the SFC General Code. The SFC considered Moody’s to have breached, 
inter alia33, the following two general principles of the SFC General Code and 
exercised its power34 to impose a fine of HK$23 million: 
 
 “General Principle 1: Honesty and fairness 
In conducting its business activities, a licensed or registered person 
should act honestly, fairly, and in the best interests of its clients and the 
integrity of the market. 
 
 General Principle 2: Diligence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 SFO Schedule 5, Part 2. The definition also contains exemptions not relevant to the 
Moody’s case 
30 SFC CRA Code para 2 
31 SFO Schedule 5, Part 2 
32 Determination of the Securities and Futures Appeals Tribunal (the “Determination”) para 
66 
33 The SFC had also alleged a breach of para 4.3 of the SFC General Code concerned with 
internal controls and operational resources, however, the Tribunal struck down that 
allegation. 
34 Under section 194 of the SFO 
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In conducting its business activities, a licensed or registered person 
should act with due skill, care and diligence, in the best interests of 
its clients and the integrity of the market.”35 
 
To the above summary, it is of interest to note three things.  
 
First, at the time of the introduction of the SFC CRA Code, there was some 
discussion, and lack of clarity in the market, as to what provisions of the SFC 
General Code are intended to apply to CRAs, or how such provisions are intended 
to be applied. For example, certain provisions appear not to be relevant to 
CRAs,36 while other provisions are in effect superseded by the more specific 
provisions of the SFC CRA Code.37  
 
Second, that the disciplinary action brought by the SFC was based on the SFC 
General Code. The more specifically targeted SFC CRA Code, surprisingly, was not 
cited in the SFC’s disciplinary action.  
 
Third, something that will be returned to in subsequent sections of this paper, 
that the SFC and the Tribunal referred to the effect of the RF Report in the debt 
and equity markets. In particular, it was observed that the share price of “more 
than half of the issuers red-flagged in the [RF] Report had experienced 
substantial falls.”38 Much seemed to be made of this effect in the market. 	  
2.4 The Tribunal’s determination39 
 
Moody’s appeal of the SFC’s disciplinary action brought before the Tribunal the 
central question of whether the SFC had jurisdiction over the issue of the RF 
Report: “[I]n terms of the relevant statutory provisions, did the publication of the 
[RF] Report (of itself) constitute the provision of credit rating services?”40 Only if 
the answer to that question was in the positive would the SFC have jurisdiction 
over Moody’s in relation to the RF Report.41  
 
The Tribunal’s analysis, in brief overview, is as follows. 
 
The Tribunal observed that “the greater number of red flags … the greater the 
number of warning signs, the greater the need on the part of market participants 
for scrutiny.”42 It had little difficulty in finding the red flag framework comprised a 
“well-defined system or mechanism for judging levels of credit risk” 43 in which 
the number of red flags assigned to a company reflecting a ranking of risk,44 and 
noted that Moody’s described the red flag mechanism to be a method that could 
be applied more widely to other corporates.45 It was “clearly a system that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 SFC General Code page 1. 
36 General Principles 4 and 8; para 3.4 since CRAs provide opinions as distinct from giving 
advice; and Schedule 2 
37 For example, para 3.10 
38 Determination para 37 
39 The Determination can be found at http://www.sfat.gov.hk/english/determination/AN-4-
2014-Determination.pdf 
40 Determination para 80 
41 Although not addressed by the Tribunal (due to the scope of its function), the SFC may 
nevertheless have powers in relation to the RF Report qua information in the marketplace 
– this is discussed in Section 5 below. 
42 Determination para 93 
43 Determination para 93 
44 Determination para 92 
45 Determination para 90 
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assessed elements of credit risk by a form of ranking.”46 In these regards the 
Tribunal also noted that the report was said to be “actionable”, an expression 
taken as meaning that it was capable of giving rise to some form of action.47  The 
RF Report presenting itself as an actionable methodology – i.e. a system. 48  
 
The Tribunal also expressed the view that “the red flag framework operated on 
the basis that the greater the number of flags triggered the greater the potential 
credit risk”. 49 Its own summary connects the red flag system exclusively to credit 
risk:50 
 
the red flags “constituted a warning sign of potential credit risk”; 
the categories outlined “elements of potential credit risk”; 
therefore, a higher number of flags represented higher “potential credit risk” 
and the allocation of no red flags meant “within the scope of the framework, 
no credit risk element”; and 
the framework was applicable to “high yield companies”.  
 
The Tribunal, taking the view that “the phrase ‘credit ratings’ is broadly 
defined”,51 determined that the RF Report either is itself a credit rating, or, if it is 
not, then it is “part and parcel of Moody’s ratings themselves” on the basis that 
the RF Report is intended to amplify and supplement, and is “intimately attendant 
upon”, Moody’s credit ratings.52 Accordingly, Moody’s “preparation and publication 
of the red flag framework fell within the statutory definition of regulated 
activities”,53 and was subject to the SFC’s codes and disciplinary powers arising in 
relation thereto. The SFC’s fine was reduced from HK$23 million to HK$11 million, 
a public reprimand, and a costs sharing order. Moody’s has since lodged an 
appeal that will take the matter to the Court of Appeal. 
 
The foregoing overview of the Tribunal’s determination will be expanded upon in 
the following sections. Section 3 examines the Tribunal’s purposive approach to 
interpreting the relevant law, Section 4 examines its view that “credit rating” is 
broadly defined, and Section 5 examines its treatment of the press release. 
 
3. THE TRIBUNAL’S APPROACH 
 
The central issue before the Tribunal was essentially one that required 
interpretation of legislation, namely, the provisions in the SFO defining the extent 
and scope of Type 10 regulated activity. This would determine the proper reach of 
the SFC’s regulatory jurisdiction.  
 
The introduction of the CRA regime in Hong Kong being relatively new, there is no 
judicial precedent on the matter. Nor does there appear to be any judicial ruling 
internationally that might be of assistance.54 Accordingly, the Tribunal undertook 
a purposive interpretation of the relevant provisions, noting this requires “that 
the language of a statutory provision is to be construed having regard to its 
context and purpose” (emphasis added).55 The Tribunal cites HKSAR v Cheung 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Determination para 96 
47 Determination para 101 
48 Determination para 152 
49 Determination para 31 
50 Determination para 92 
51 Determination para 81 
52 Determination para 102 
53 Determination para 102 
54 See footnote 21 above 
55 Per Mr Justice Fok PJ in Pacific Sun Advisors Ltd and Another v. Securities and Futures 
Commission [2015] HKCFA 27 at para 34 
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Kwun Yin56 that under such an approach statutory language is to bear its “natural 
and ordinary meaning unless the context or purpose points to different 
meaning”.57   
 
This Section 3 raises questions over three central aspects of the Tribunal’s 
purposive approach: (1) the entry point for its analysis, (2) its reliance on factors 
lying outside the four sides of the RF Report, and (3) its consideration of the 
SFC’s regulatory jurisdiction from a disciplinary perspective. In each of these 
aspects it will be seen that an underlying position of the Tribunal is that the RF 
Report is connected with or related to Moody’s existing credit ratings - that facet 
of the Tribunal’s determination is discussed in Section 4. 
 
3.1 Entry point for application of the purposive approach 
 
The Tribunal posited the core question for its interpretative exercise as being: 
“did the publication of the [RF] Report (of itself) constitute the provision of credit 
rating services? … In determining this issue it is important to note that the phrase 
‘credit ratings’ is broadly defined.”58 
 
The natural and ordinary reading of the definition of Type 10 regulated activity is 
that it can only occur in respect of credit ratings. Accordingly, the first matter 
that would seem to require consideration is whether an item of information is or 
is not a credit rating – only if it is would it seem relevant to consider the further 
requirements attaching to Type 10 regulated activity. 
 
This is consistent with the international context being primarily concerned with 
the quality of credit ratings themselves – the means by which the G20 envisaged 
that would be safeguarded was via a registration system and a regulatory 
oversight regime consistent with the IOSCO CRA Code.59 That regulatory 
oversight of CRAs is the means by which the quality of credit ratings is 
strengthened is also reflected in Article 1 of the EU regulations.60 Accordingly, the 
approach internationally has been to use regulatory definitions that build on each 
other, namely, a definition of ‘credit rating’ and a definition of ‘credit rating 
agency’. 
 
Different jurisdictions have implemented CRA regulation in a way that fits into 
their own legal and regulatory architecture but nevertheless achieves sufficient 
consistency with the approach internationally. In Hong Kong, the means by which 
the primary objective of bringing credit ratings under regulatory oversight was via 
the creation of the Type 10 regulatory activity.61 
 
As noted above, the Tribunal considers the term “credit rating” to be broadly 
defined, sufficiently so that it does not undertake any detailed analysis of the 
term. Rather, its focus settles on the regulated activity. Section 4 below argues 
that “credit rating” in fact carries a specific meaning and that the Tribunal has 
glossed over important differences between elements that pertain to credit risk, 
the concept of creditworthiness, and the opinion that is expressed on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 (2009) 12 HKCFAR 568 
57 Ibid. Per Chief Justice Li at para 12 
58 Determination para 80-81 
59 Group of Twenty (G20) “Declaration on strengthening the financial system – London, 2 
April 2009” 
60 EU Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 
61 This approach is similar to the NRSRO system in the U.S. in which CRAs are recognized 
by the relevant authorities – see DW Arner et al, “Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in 
Hong Kong: Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis” Banking & Finance Law Review 25.3 
(Jun 2010): 361-403, page 369 
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creditworthiness. If the argument in Section 4 is correct, it would be erroneous to 
take Type 10 regulated activity as a focal point for the determination without first 
examining whether the information issued was in fact a credit rating. (It should 
be added here that the Tribunal does accept an alternative view that even if the 
RF Report and the red flag framework was not itself a credit rating it is 
nevertheless part and parcel of Moody’s credit rating services – this is discussed 
in Sections 3.3 and 5 of this paper.) 
 
3.2 Consideration of extrinsic factors 
 
In determining the nature of the report and Moody’s issuance of it, the Tribunal 
considered the following factors lying outside the four sides of the RF Report: (1) 
Moody’s intended purposes62 in issuing the RF Report,63 (2) its effect in the equity 
and debt markets,64 and (3) the press release issued the day the RF Report was 
issued.65  
 
The language of Hong Kong’s statutory CRA regime is silent as to such extrinsic 
factors. An examination of other provisions of the SFO dealing with regulatory 
objectives similar to those sought under the CRA regime indicate that where the 
Legislature has chosen to bring extrinsic matters within the scope of a provision, 
it has done so clearly and with good reason. Considering other provisions of the 
SFO is consistent with the purposive approach when seeking “to determine 
whether any conclusions can be drawn as to … legislative intent.”66 Per Chief 
Justice Li, “The context of a statutory provision should be taken in its widest 
sense and certainly includes the other provisions of the statute and the existing 
state of the law.”67 The analysis in Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3 questions whether the 
Legislature intended such extrinsic matters to be relevant to the CRA regime. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Per the Tribunal (all para references are to the Determination): “as to the nature and 
purpose of” the RF Report (para 19); “the purpose [of the RF Report] being to highlight…” 
(para 21); “In the present case, it is submitted that the nature and purpose of the [RF] 
Report was so closely allied to and so immediately consequent upon Moody’s Type 10 
regulated activities that…” (para 66); “whether it was intended by Moody’s or not, the red 
flag framework … constituted a credit rating” (para 93); the intent to produce something 
‘actionable’ (para 100-101) and “the intended meaning of the word ‘actionable’” (para 
152); “it is evident that it was intended to be read as amplifying and supplementing 
Moody’s ratings” (para 102); “those responsible for compiling the Report intended that it 
should be more than a mere comment piece” (para 130); the discussion of whether or not 
it was “intended to add anything to the existing ratings” (para 147); the red flags were 
“intended to impact on the market and they did so” (para 193); “a report that was 
intended to have an impact on the market” (para 214) 
63 The Tribunal considers a number of Moody’s internal communications, including in 
several paragraphs of the determination specifically addressed to the “genesis of the 
report”, see Determination para 124 to 133 
64 Per the Tribunal (all para references are to the Determination): the RF Report “was 
clearly intended for the market… it was intended to have an impact” (para 3); “The [RF] 
Report was published at a time of considerable concern in the market as to” (para 18); the 
discussion at para 29; “more than half of the issuers red-flagged in the Report had 
experienced substantial falls. Four of the six issuers identified in the Report as negative 
outliers suffered the biggest drops” (para 37); “In the judgment of the Tribunal, Moody’s 
must have appreciated in such circumstances that in all probability the Report would have 
a material impact on the market, that is, an impact of consequence” (para 42); the red 
flags were “intended to impact on the market and they did so” (para 193); “a report that 
was intended to have an impact on the market” (para 214) 
65 The press release can be found here (last accessed May 2016) 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Accounting-and-governance-warning-signs-
for-emerging-market-companies--PR_222323 
66 Pacific Sun Advisors Ltd and Another v. Securities and Futures Commission [2015] 
HKCFA 27; Facc 11/2014 (20 March 2015) at para 25 
67 Cheung Kwun Yin op. cit. at para 13 
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That it might not be the intent of the Legislature is consistent with the 
international origins of CRA regulation in Hong Kong, as discussed in Section 3.1 
above, which takes as it primary focus the quality of the credit rating as an item 
of information. 
 
3.2.1 Issuer’s intent 
 
When defining the scope of regulated activities, the SFO is clear about the role of 
intent. The two other regulated activities that centrally involve the dissemination 
of information to clients or to the public are advising on securities (Type 4 
regulated activity) and advising on futures contracts (Type 5 regulated activity). 
The definition of both activities includes “issuing analyses or reports, for the 
purposes of facilitating the recipients of the analyses or reports to make 
decisions” (emphasis added).68 In construing those definitions, the purpose and 
intended use of the relevant material will be relevant to consider.  
 
This may be contrasted with the definition for “providing credit rating services” 
(Type 10 regulated activity), which refers only to “preparing credit ratings … for 
dissemination to the public… or for distribution by subscription”.69 There is no 
reference as to the intended purpose or use of the credit rating.  
 
Unlike Types 4 and 5 regulated activities in which the phrase “analyses or 
reports” is not specifically defined by the SFO (and which presumably take on 
their ordinary meaning), Type 10 regulated activity specifically refers to 
“preparing credit ratings” – the term “credit rating” having been expressly 
defined by the SFO. That term also contains no element of intent or purpose, only 
the nature of the material qua opinion needs to be considered.  
 
Intention has a very limited and precise scope of relevance in the CRA regime - if 
the material was in fact a credit rating one can then consider the rudimentary 
matter of whether there was an intention to disseminate or distribute the 
material.70 To put this another way, intent alone seems incapable of changing the 
nature of information that has been distributed. 
 
That the language of intended purpose is used in respect of Type 4 regulated 
activity but not Type 10 is of particular interest in view of concerns, expressed 
during the SFC’s public consultations on the proposed legislative changes that:  
 
“the issuing of credit ratings will be distinguishable from Type 4 regulated 
activity (advising on securities), even in the case of broker 
recommendations using a defined ranking system (such as “buy”, “hold” 
or “sell”). Advising on securities may include providing opinions on a 
company’s creditworthiness, but only as a factor impacting upon advice on 
whether (or which, or the time at which, or the terms or conditions on 
which) securities should be acquired or disposed of. By contrast, credit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 SFO Schedule 5, Part 2 
69 SFO Schedule 5, Part 2 
70 It is for this reason that although one might, for example, intend to disseminate a 
document believing or intending that it is a credit rating, if the document is not in fact a 
credit rating (for example, it is merely advice) then the issuer of the document is not 
actually ‘providing credit rating services’ although it may be holding itself out to be so. 
I.e., if the issuer is not licensed for Type 10 regulated activity this would be an offence 
under section 114(1)(b) but not section 114(1)(a) of the SFO. The act of holding out 
clearly is incapable of affecting the nature of the report. 
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ratings, as typically understood, do not include advice on whether 
securities should be acquired or disposed of.”71 
 
As regards the broader context of legislative origin, the distinctions made in the 
SFO reflect the international approach to CRA regulation in which an issuer’s 
intended purpose or expected use of information issued by them plays no role. 
 
3.2.2 Consequences in the market 
 
There seems no doubt both the debt and equity market did in fact respond to the 
release of the RF Report, and as noted above the Tribunal refers to this on 
several occasions. While there also seems little doubt that Moody’s intended the 
RF Report to be utilized by market participants, the issue of intent vis-à-vis the 
nature of the report has been dealt with above.  
 
Share prices can respond to changes in debt ratings72 but they also respond to a 
variety of new types of information coming into the market. As noted by the 
Tribunal, “credit ratings are important because they enable market participants to 
employ these opinions as screening devices to match the relative credit risk of 
issuers of debt instruments with their own risk tolerance.”73 However, the core 
question for the purposes of statutory interpretation is whether market reactions 
are relevant to determining whether a report, such as the RF Report, is a credit 
rating or the issuance of it Type 10 regulated activity. 
 
A central concern of the SFO is to safeguard the integrity of the market. It 
contains several mechanisms designed to that purpose including controls over 
access to the market. Defining certain types of services as regulated activities 
that are subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the SFC, including that of CRAs, 
is one such mechanism. Another is concerned with the dissemination of 
information into the market and a credit rating once issued also constitutes 
information in the market. Again having regard to the process of interpretation 
undertaken in Pacific Sun and the purposes of the legislation (see also Section 6.2 
below), these market-oriented information provisions are also relevant to 
consider.  
 
The SFO is specific as to when expectations, responses or effects in the market 
are to be taken into account to meet its legislative purposes. Sections 277 and 
298 of the SFO, both concerned with the disclosure of false or misleading 
information inducing transactions, requires that the information “is likely” to 
induce transactions or maintain, increase, reduce or stabilize prices in securities 
or futures contracts.74 Civil liability in respect of disseminated information also 
specifically requires that the information “may affect” prices.75 The concept of 
inside information for the purposes of both insider dealing legislation and the 
disclosure obligations of listed companies76 is also expressly tied to the concept 
that the information would “be likely to materially affect the price of the listed 
securities”.77 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 SFC’s Consultation Paper Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies, 19 July 2010, para 16 
72 For example, see Barron MJ, Clarke AD and Thomas SH, “The effect of bond rating 
changes and new ratings on UK stock returns”, Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 1997, vol 24, p497-509 
73 Determination para 12 
74 Section 277(1)(c) and 298(1) of the SFO 
75 section 391(1)(b) of the SFO 
76 Relevant to Parts XIII, XIV and XIVA of the SFO 
77 Sections 245(2), 285(2) and 307A(1) of the SFO 
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In contrast, neither Type 10 regulated activity nor any of the other regulated 
activities are concerned with effects in the market. This reflects the nature of 
Hong Kong’s regulatory architecture which provides for classes of regulated 
activity that are defined by the acts undertaken not by the consequences of acts. 
Consequences are the concern of other provisions of the SFO. Accordingly, if the 
market had exhibited no response to the RF Report, this also would not impact on 
whether or not the report was a credit rating. 
 
The SFO’s different concerns with market integrity as regards information that 
flows into it, and market integrity as regards the activities that take place in the 
market, are distinct and reflect the fundamental structure of its architecture. 
Observing this design in applying the law to facts is critical for the proper 
operation of the SFO. 
 
3.2.3 The press release  
 
The Tribunal cites the press release issued the day the RF Report was published 
as relevant to an understanding of “the nature and purpose”78 of the RF Report. It 
is part of its finding that the RF Report was “part and parcel”79 of Moody’s existing 
credit ratings, and considers that the press release conditioned readers in such a 
way as to influence their reading and understanding of the RF Report. It therefore 
forms part of the means by which the Tribunal considered Moody’s to have 
engaged in Type 10 regulated activity when it issued the RF Report. 
 
The Tribunal states that “The press release explained that the red flag framework 
was ‘supplemental to’ Moody’s methodological approach to rating”80 and suggests 
that the word “supplemental” served to import the meaning that the red flags 
added to and/or amplified Moody’s existing credit ratings.81 It also notes the SFC 
considered the press release as relevant.82 According to the SFC, the press 
release forms part of “the impression being created that the red flag framework 
was a part of Moody’s established methodology”83 and that the RF Report and 
press release “created confusion”.84 
 
However, the Tribunal does not cite any legislative or other legal basis on which it 
is appropriate to consider the press release as relevant to the nature of the RF 
Report or the question of Type 10 regulated activity.  
 
The SFO itself neither provides for nor limits the form or documentary basis on 
which a credit rating opinion is to be expressed. Certainly, the press release itself 
is incapable of expressing an opinion insofar as nothing is expressed on any 
specific rating target. Nor does the SFO provide for the deemed incorporation into 
a rating opinion of statements made at the time of issue of a credit rating. This 
may of course be relevant for other purposes in the SFO (e.g. provisions dealing 
with the integrity of information disseminated in the market) but it is not 
provided for in the CRA context. That this is so is again consistent with the 
international approach to CRA regulation which is focussed on the quality of the 
opinion that has been given and the general understanding, reflected in the SFC 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Determination para 19 
79 Determination para 74 and 102 
80 Determination para 21. See also Determination para 153 
81 Determination para 32 
82 In its Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action dated 14 February 2013, as cited in the 
Determination 
83 Determination para 51(a), See also Determination para 45 
84 See Determination para 148 citing the SFC’s Decision Notice Notice of Proposed 
Disciplinary Action dated 14 February 2013 
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CRA Code,85 that ratings are expressed via a defined ranking system comprised of 
well defined and consistently used symbols (such as AAA, AA, etc.). The topic of 
defined ranking systems is further discussed in Section 4.3.1.  
 
The SFC CRA Code does in fact require a CRA to issue a press release when 
issuing or revising a credit rating that explains the key elements of the rating.86 
However, there is also nothing in the SFC CRA Code suggesting such an 
explanation in any way affects or is to be read together with the credit rating. The 
two remain quite separate items attending different purposes. Press releases may 
of course be issued by CRAs for other purposes not connected with their 
regulated activities. 
 
The position in relation to CRA regulation contrasts with the Legislative approach 
taken in respect of another form of information-bearing document issued to the 
public, namely, prospectuses. In that context the governing legislation87 
contemplates that a prospectus may be comprised in multiple documents,88 that 
statements may be incorporated by reference or issued together with a 
prospectus,89 and that other public notices may affect liability arising in 
connection with a prospectus.90 
 
This leaves considerable uncertainty as to the precise basis on which the press 
release has been incorporated by reference for the purposes of defining whether 
or not a regulated activity has been engaged in. The press release is further 
discussed in Section 5 below where it is argued that even if the press release is 
appropriate to consider, it nevertheless does not have the import alleged by the 
Tribunal. 
 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
 
While it might seem quite natural to enquire of the matters surrounding the 
publication of the RF Report, Sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3 raise a number of doubts 
over the Tribunal’s consideration of, and approach to them. 
  
That the handling of credit rating activities under the SFO is somewhat different 
from other parts of the SFO concerned with regulated activities or the quality of 
information in the market is traceable back to the originating purposes for 
bringing CRAs under regulatory oversight. 
 
3.3 Regulated and non-regulated services 
 
As noted in Section 3.1, the purposive approach taken by the Tribunal brings 
emphasis to the activity rather than the “credit rating” question per se. In doing 
so it also places some emphasis on the SFC’s powers under section 194 of the 
SFO to impose disciplinary action where a regulated intermediary has engaged in 
misconduct, which includes any  
 
“act or omission relating to the carrying on of any regulated activity …  
which, in the opinion of the [SFC], is or is likely to be prejudicial to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Para 53 
86 Para 55 
87 Companies (Winding-up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, cap. 32 (“CWUMPO”) 
88 Section 39B of the CWUMPO 
89 Section 41A(1)(b) of the CWUMPO. It can also be noted that section 2(1) of the 
CWUMPO also covers documents that are “calculated to invite offers” 
90 Sections 40(2) and (3)(b) of the CWUMPO 
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interest of the investing public or to the public interest” (emphasis 
added).91 
 
As already noted (and which will be queried in Section 4), the Tribunal’s position 
is that the RF Report is connected to Moody’s existing ratings. As such, “in giving 
a purposive construction to the relevant statutory provisions, the act of 
publication [of the RF Report] must be held to be an act relating to those earlier 
ratings.”92 The Tribunal observes that the phrase “relating to” is “capable of 
bearing a broad or narrow meaning in order to further the legislative purpose.”93 
 
There is a sense in which the invocation of sections 193 and 194 rests on an 
almost tautological presumption that the act complained of already falls within 
some broad scope of an intermediary’s regulated activities, which is precisely the 
matter in issue. The separation of “relating to” as a proposition in the line of 
reasoning merely represents the dénouement of the tautology. However, putting 
aside that disquiet, the reason for the Tribunal electing a broad reading of the 
phrase is not clear, nor is it clear whether such a reading furthers or in fact 
hinders the legislative purpose. The Tribunal’s broad reading of the phrase gives 
rise to several issues. 
 
First, it implies that various acts that are not part of a “regulated activity” would 
not be regarded as misconduct when undertaken by a person who holds no 
license or registration, but might be if exactly the same acts were undertaken by 
a person who is licensed or registered. That the regulatory nature of an act 
should be determined by the identity of the person undertaking the act, not the 
act itself, is inconsistent with Hong Kong’s regulatory architecture and seems to 
offend the principle of a level playing field. It creates the problem that if an 
unregulated person had issued the RF Report, the issuer of it would not be 
subject to the same regulatory powers of the SFC as Moody’s – while the 
unregulated person might have committed some other breach of the law,94 this 
will not always be the case.  
 
Second, it is at odds with the phrase being essentially limited by the requirement 
that it must relate to “the carrying on of any regulated activity”. A relationship to 
other business activities would not suffice. For example, section 27(1)(b) of the 
SFO, dealing with records of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited refers to 
“information relating to its business”. In contrast, the language of section 193 
does not broadly refer to a regulated person’s business but only to its regulated 
activities There are a number of other provisions in the SFO that are similarly 
limited.95  
 
Third, given that “relating to” is somewhat imprecise, a broad reading may create 
considerable uncertainty among regulated persons insofar as any non-regulated 
act they undertake might subsequently be construed as “related to” their 
regulated activities without any clear legal or regulatory guidelines on the matter. 
However, the SFO already contemplates guidance as to a regulated person’s 
undertaking - the SFC is empowered to make codes of conduct “for the purpose 
of giving guidance relating to the practices and standards with which [regulated 
persons] are ordinarily expected to comply in carrying on the regulated activities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Section 193(1)(d) 
92 Determination para 106 
93 Determination para 106 
94  For example, holding itself out as engaging in a regulated activity or distributing false 
information 
95 For example, see section 113 of the SFO, definition of “regulated function” which is 
similarly restricted to regulated activities 
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for which the intermediaries are licensed or registered” (emphasis added).96 This 
language does not sit comfortably with a broad reading of “relating to” in section 
193(1)(d) of the SFO, the application of which first requires regard to be had to 
the SFC’s codes of conduct.97 Indeed, the SFC’s codes do not appear to carry 
such a wide remit that they address activities that are not themselves regulated – 
there would be no legislative basis for the codes to do so. 
 
Fourth, the above concerns suggest that the Tribunal’s reading could significantly 
blur the tight lines drawn by the SFO around specific types of activity as being 
regulated. In the context of the introduction of the CRA regime, the SFC 
emphasized during consultation process the necessity to keep regulated activities 
distinct from each other and, in particular, to “effectively distinguish between 
Type 4 and Type 10 regulated activities”.98 If the definition of “providing credit 
rating services” is drawn uncertainly then one must consider whether the 
provision would continue to serve its purpose. Moreover, as those consultation 
papers constitute recommendations made by a statutory body that are 
subsequently implemented in the legislation, they may properly be taken into 
account when identifying the purpose of legislation.99  
 
Finally, returning to the purposive approach, Chief Justice Li has stated “The 
context of a statutory provision should be taken in its widest sense and certainly 
includes the other provisions of the statute and the existing state of the law.”100 
This requires a consideration of the SFO as a whole and asking whether a 
particular interpretation is necessary or desirable having regard to its purposes. 
In this regard it may be observed that other parts of the SFO amply address acts 
that do not themselves comprise regulated activities. Significant portions of the 
SFO are concerned with acts related to information that may impact on the 
integrity of the market and that apply irrespective of a person’s regulated 
status.101  
 
It is suggested the Tribunal’s broad reading of the phrase is not needed to meet 
the purposes of the legislation, and that it instead gives rise to greater problems.  
 
Section 6.2 below discusses the information-related provisions of the SFO that 
may be relevant to the RF Report. 
 
3.4 Conclusions on the Tribunal’s purposive approach 
 
The foregoing considerations raise doubts over whether the Tribunal’s approach is 
“purposive” or in fact “results oriented”, reflecting a concern expressed by Lord 
Millet NPJ102 as regards the use and misuse of the purposive approach. Whatever 
the intention of the Legislature may have been, the purposive approach is 
ultimately restricted to seeking the meaning of the words the Legislature has in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Section 169(1) of the SFO 
97 Section 193(3) of the SFO 
98 SFC’s “Consultation Conclusions Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, 29 October 2010, para 22 
99 Per Chief Justice Li at para 14 of Cheung Kwun Yin op. cit.: "Where the legislation in 
question implements the recommendations of a report, such as a Law Reform Commission 
report, the report may be referred to in order to identify the purpose of the legislation.”  
100 Cheung Kwun Yin op. cit. at para 13 
101 Including sections 107, 108, 391 and Parts XIII, XIV and XIVA of the SFO 
102 “there has been a distressing development by the courts which allows them to distort 
or even ignore the plain meaning of the text and construe the statute in whatever manner 
achieves a result which they consider desirable” [2009] 5 HKC 231, para. 36 and (2009) 
12 HFCFAR 342 
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fact used.103 It is therefore suggested the language used in the SFO does not in 
fact support the purposive interpretation employed by the Tribunal.  
 
The Tribunal’s approach sits uncomfortably with the hierarchy of the terms 
defined by the SFO which, on a natural and ordinary reading, recognizes it is not 
the case that all activities of Type 10 licensed corporations are regulated – only 
the credit ratings it issues are. This underpinned Moody’s argument before the 
Tribunal that the SFC had no jurisdiction over the RF Report.	  
 
In common with the approach taken internationally, Hong Kong’s CRA regulatory 
architecture implicitly recognizes the origins of CRAs are historically borne out of 
business analysis and that modern day CRAs can and do issue research that 
amounts to business analysis.104 Accordingly, Hong Kong’s legislation does not 
prohibit a CRA from engaging in ancillary services,105 and the SFC CRA Code 
expressly permits it subject to the requirement that it does not create a conflict 
of interest for its credit rating services.106 It is also expressly permitted by EU 
regulations provided the independence or integrity of the CRA is not 
compromised.107 The EU regulations also clarify that ancillary services are not 
part of credit rating activities.108  
 
Such analyses and ancillary services are not normally regarded as credit ratings 
notwithstanding that they may discuss elements relevant to assessments of credit 
risk, and that they may address specific corporate situations. Indeed, Moody’s 
issues a variety of research documents that are not treated as credit ratings.109 
The distinction between a discussion of elements of credit risk and giving opinions 
on creditworthiness is an important one to make, though at times appears 
muddled in the Tribunal’s determination. This distinction is further discussed in 
the next section. 	  
In view of the foregoing considerations, it is not consistent with either the 
development of the CRA regulatory regime or the structure and purpose of the 
SFO to frame an investigation into whether or not a credit rating has been issued 
by looking to the issuer’s licensed status to determine the nature of a report it 
has issued. That would be the wrong starting point. Nor is it appropriate to 
selectively look at acts and consequences from a remedial point of view without 
considering other remedial provisions of the SFO that are arguably more clearly 
relevant to the alleged wrongdoing.110  
 
Rather, insofar as the scope of the CRA regulatory regime is concerned, one must 
start by looking at the information that has been issued and ask whether or not it 
meets the statutory requirements for being a “credit rating”. Section 4 
undertakes such an analysis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Per Lord Reid in Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof – 
Aschaffenburg AG [1975] AC 591 at 613G, cited with approval in Cheung Kwun Yin op. cit. 
104 Langhor page 2 
105 The SFC, in line with international practice, rejected the concept that CRAs should be 
subject to a sole business restriction. See SFC’s “Consultation Conclusions Concerning the 
Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies”, 29 October 2010 para 63 
106 SFC CRA Code para 30 
107 Recital 6, EU Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 
108 Anex 1, Section B EU Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. “Credit rating activities” is defined 
by Article 3, 2 as meaning “data and information analysis and the evaluation, approval, 
issuing and review of credit ratings” 
109 For example, its Weekly Market Outlook publication discusses a variety of market, 
economic and business matters that may be relevant to credit assessment. 
110 Discussed in Section 6.2 
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4. CONSTRUING THE RF REPORT AS A CREDIT RATING 
 
The Tribunal determined the RF Report to be either (1) itself a credit rating or (2) 
“part and parcel of Moody’s ratings themselves.”111 This Section 4 discusses the 
former, Section 5 discusses the latter. In both sections, the considerations of 
Section 3 have, to the extent possible, been put aside for these purposes. 
 
This Section 4 undertakes a detailed analysis of the more specific means by which 
the Tribunal has sought to identify the issuance of the RF Report as Type 10 
regulated activity, as well as the specific language used by the Legislature in 
providing for the CRA regulatory regime. It argues, contra the Tribunal, that the 
scope of “credit rating” and “providing credit rating services” is in fact subject to 
well-defined parameters in which certain matters are to be considered to the 
exclusion of other considerations. It concludes that the RF Report falls short of 
meeting the requirements of the statutorily defined term. 
 
Section 4.1 reviews the means by which the Tribunal has framed the RF Report 
as a credit rating. It is suggested that the link established by the Tribunal is 
tenuous at best, and appears based on an analysis that is in some ways back-to-
front. 
 
Section 4.2 clarifies the distinction between credit risk, creditworthiness and a 
credit rating, a distinction that appears to be at times muddled in the 
determination. That a report may comment on risks pertinent to creditworthiness 
does not suffice to render it a credit rating. 
 
Section 4.3 comprises a more detailed examination of the defined term “credit 
rating”. Section 4.3.1 considers the meaning of the phrase “using a defined 
ranking system”. Section 4.3.2 considers the meaning of the phrase “primarily 
regarding” creditworthiness. It is argued that the Tribunal’s construal of “credit 
rating” has not taken into account factors relevant to Legislative purpose when 
introducing CRA regulation that affect the nature of the RF Report. It is concluded 
that the RF Report falls outside the perimeter of CRA regulatory oversight. 	  
4.1 The Tribunal’s position 
 
Connecting the red flag framework exclusively and particularly to an opinion on 
creditworthiness is not a straightforward matter. Nowhere in the RF Report does 
Moody’s describe the red flag framework as identifying creditworthiness per se or 
implying an impact on their existing rating opinions. The opening paragraph of 
the RF Report describes the red flag framework as “highlight[ing] issues meriting 
scrutiny to identify possible governance or accounting risks for nonfinancial 
corporate issuers”. The front page of the RF Report also states that the 
framework “can help identify areas to investigate but cannot serve as 
mechanisms to rank order credit risk”, and that the red flags “do not represent a 
change in our rating methodologies.” 
 
The Tribunal’s determination is less than clear precisely how that “something 
more” is established that causes the RF Report to be a credit rating. The Tribunal 
somewhat peremptorily states that “The [RF] Report is focused on, and gives 
opinions regarding, the credit worthiness of the corporate issuers” and goes on to 
cite, apparently in support, that: 
 
“The opening sentence of the [RF] Report … states: ‘In rapidly developing 
emerging markets, the use of frameworks to assess elements of credit risk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Determination para 102 
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provides consistency in identifying relative strengths and weaknesses 
across a growing pool of rated issuers.’”112   	  
The cited statement from the RF Report is patently somewhat generic and does 
not on an ordinary reading mean that the red flag framework is itself or is 
intended to be a credit rating system. Indeed, the next sentence of the RF Report 
states “In this report, we look at 20 red flags … that highlight issues meriting 
scrutiny to identify possible governance or accounting risks for non-financial 
corporate issuers in emerging markets.” An ordinary reading of that sentence also 
does not imply that the red flag framework, or Moody’s, goes beyond assessing 
elements of credit risk to express a credit rating.  
 
While the Tribunal does seek to “look at the report as a whole”113 and does 
consider various qualifications in the RF Report,114 the approach is influenced by 
other considerations. The relevance of certain extrinsic factors have been 
discussed in Section 3 but have been put aside for the purposes of the discussion 
in this section. The media and research reports cited by the Tribunal115 appear to 
have been referenced under a presumption that either (1) the RF Report is a 
credit rating, (2) they support the basis on which the RF Report is a credit rating, 
or (3) they are somehow otherwise relevant to its determination. If so, this would 
represent a back-to-front approach.  
 
Consider the citation of the Market Watch reference to Cantor Fitzgerald’s view 
that “markets should demand higher credit premium and lower stock valuation 
for companies receiving such ‘red flags’ in compensation for these risks.”116 One 
can agree with the Tribunal this indicated the companies the subject of the RF 
Report “were now seen by the market – whatever the qualifications given by 
Moody’s in the Report – as carrying risks that could not be ignored”.117 However, 
that investors might read the contents of the report as relevant to credit premium 
logically cannot be upended into an argument that the red flag system constitutes 
a credit rating. A categorization based around “how many red flags” may be 
merely an emergent quality of the red flag framework rather than one that 
defines and shapes the framework into a credit rating per se. IOSCO’s definition 
that: 
 
“’Credit rating’… means an assessment regarding the creditworthiness of 
an entity or obligation, expressed using an established and defined 
ranking system”118  
 
cannot be reversed into: 
 
credit ratings are assessments of credit risk that produce a defined 
ranking system.  
 
Rather, to satisfy the statutory definition of “credit rating” it is necessary that the 
data set be used to express an opinion. In this regard, the approach of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 At para 87 
113 Determination para 96 
114  Eg at Determination para 94 and 97 
115 Market Watch, Apple Daily and Bloomberg (all dated 12 July 2011); Macquarie Equities 
Research note dated 13 July 2011; Wall Street Journal, edition of 24 July 2011 (see 
Determination para 34, 35, 36, 39, 43) 
116 Determination para 35 
117 Determination para 37 
118 “Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies” IOSCO FR05/2015, March 
2015, page A-4 
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Tribunal at times appears to muddle the distinction between credit risk, 
creditworthiness and a credit rating, as discussed next.	  
 
4.2 Ratings and creditworthiness distinguished 
 
The Tribunal noted that credit ratings refer to the risk of debt not being paid 
when due: 
 
“‘Credit ratings’ have been described as ‘opinions about relative credit risk’ 
and ‘credit risk’ itself has been described as ‘the potential for loss due to 
failure of a borrower to meet its contractual obligation to repay a debt in 
accordance with the agreed terms’.” 119  
 
This definition, while not incorrect and useful for many purposes, glosses over the 
important distinction, implicit in the statutorily defined term, between (1) 
“creditworthiness” qua the assessment of credit risk, and (2) “credit rating” which 
refers only to the opinion expressed on creditworthiness. 
 
The Tribunal’s determination does not always clearly distinguish between the two 
in the hierarchical manner required by the legislation, resulting in some 
uncertainty as to the exact means by which the Tribunal connects the red flag 
framework exclusively and particularly to being an opinion on creditworthiness.  
 
The Tax Court of Canada provides one of the few judicial statements of 
relevance:  
 
“In general, a credit rating is a credit rating agency's opinion of the 
general creditworthiness of an obligor, or the creditworthiness of an 
obligor with respect to a particular debt security or other financial 
obligation, based on relevant risk factors.” 120 
 
This statement is in general alignment with the definition provided by the SFO.  
 
“Creditworthiness” is not defined by the SFO, the term only appearing once in the 
ordinance. It is to be distinguished from “credit rating” – they are not the same 
thing. The SFO describes the latter as being an opinion on the former. An opinion 
on creditworthiness can, if the other statutorily defined requirements are met, 
give rise to a credit rating. The distinction is one that is important to appreciate 
for the purposes of examining the Tribunal’s determination and understanding the 
nature of the RF Report.  
 
The approach not to define “creditworthiness” is consistent with international 
practice121 and suggests the word be given its ordinary meaning: “the extent to 
which a person, firm, etc., is considered suitable for financial credit.”122 
Creditworthiness thus involves a consideration of what acceptable credit risk 
means. The subjectivity of “acceptability” can be contrasted with other factors 
relevant to credit risk, such as debt-to-income ratio and collateral, which are 
quantifiable. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 The Tribunal quoting the definitions provided by the Global Association of Risk 
Professionals – see Determination para 9 120	  General Electric Capital Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2009] T.C.J. No. 489 (Tax Court 
appeal) at 49	  
121 E.g. The papers issued by IOSCO do not define ‘creditworthiness’ nor does legislation in 
the EU, US, Japan, Australia or Mexico. For example, see 15 USC 78c 
122 Oxford English Dictionary Third Edition 2013 
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Credit risk is generally recognized as representing “the capacity and willingness of 
a debtor to meet its obligations when due.”123 This involves elements of 
subjective judgment in the assessment of risk that goes beyond merely 
evaluating the relationship between an issuer’s resources and financial 
performance and its capacity to pay. A CRA must: 
 
“pay careful attention to … the competences and character of its 
management. … Ratings include a highly qualitative judgment about the 
character of the issuer, in the same way that traditional bank credit 
decisions did.”124  
 
A consideration of these factors is relevant to an assessment of credit risk, and 
some of them are reflected in the RF Report. However, an assessment of credit 
risk factors does not, for the above reasons, itself amount to an opinion being 
expressed on creditworthiness – more is required.  
 
When a CRA issues an opinion on creditworthiness: 
 
“they assess the likelihood that an issuer will default either on its financial 
obligations generally (issuer rating) or on a particular debt or fixed income 
security (instrument rating)” (emphasis added).125  
 
Expressed plainly, a credit rating is a CRA’s “opinion of how likely an issuer is to 
repay … a particular debt or financial obligation, or its debts generally.”126  
 
The distinction between elements of credit risk that are considered and the 
opinion that subsequently emerges is illustrated by the different approaches 
taken by the three largest CRAs – Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s Financial Services 
(“S&P”), and Fitch Ratings (“Fitch”). All of them “agree that a credit rating is an 
opinion about whether the issuer of a fixed income security will pay amounts due 
on time and in full […and] that ratings … place an issuer or an instrument on a 
scale from least likely to default to most likely to default”.127 While each of these 
CRAs might engage in highly similar tasks and considerations as regards an 
assessment of credit risk,128 the formation of the opinion is subject to an 
additional process that is somewhat unique to each. Moreover, the opinions once 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Q Liiu, P Lejot and DW Arner, “Finance in Asia” Routledge 2013, page 217 
124 Herwig M. Langohr and Patricia T. Langohr, “The Rating Agencies and their Credit 
Ratings: What They Are, How They Work and Why They Are Relevant”, 2008 John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd, page 31 
125 Commission of the European Communities, 2005, Communication from the Commission 
on credit rating agencies, December 23, 2005/11990, 1–9, page 2 
126 Report On The Activities of Credit Rating Agencies, IOSCO, September 2003, Statement 
of the Technical Committee of IOSCO September 2003 
127 Herwig M. Langohr and Patricia T. Langohr, “The Rating Agencies and their Credit 
Ratings: What They Are, How They Work and Why They Are Relevant”, 2008 John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd, page 24 
128 However, even at this level practices vary between different CRAs, with potentially 
significant consequences. For example, the concept of ‘default’, commonly understood as a 
failure to pay or to meet an obligation (Oxford English Dictionary) is given more specific 
meanings. Moody’s regards it is an 
“event that changes the relationship between the bondholder and the bond issuer from the 
relationship that was originally contracted, and subjects the bondholder to an economic 
loss.’ (See Cantor, R., Hamilton, D.T, Ou, S., and Varma, P., 2005, Default and recovery 
rates of corporate bond issuers, 1920–2004, Special Comment: Moody’s Investors Service, 
January, Report 91233, 1–40, page 39.) .This can give rise to a wide range of extra-
corporate circumstances becoming relevant. “Default” can also be regarded as a purely 
technical term taken from debt or similar contracts that means certain specific occurrences 
which may have consequences in terms of creditor rights  
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formed “generally correspond to probability of default treatments under the 
[relevant CRA’s] standardised approach[es]”.129 
 
Placing these considerations against the RF Report, it is clear that the red flags 
cover elements relevant to credit risk assessment. For example, quality of cash 
flow generation and deviations in working capital. The issues covered in 
understanding the companies reviewed also go beyond matters pertaining only to 
credit - the same issues are also of interest to equity investors.  
 
Each flag clearly is not an opinion on creditworthiness. They operate in a simple 
binary manner. Either the specific criterion is met and a red flag raised, or it is 
not and no flag is raised. This reflects the fundamental distinction between 
elements that might be pertinent to forming an assessment of creditworthiness, 
and a rating of creditworthiness that might or might not emerge from those 
elements. 
 
The red flags are also part of a framework. The RF Report itself makes a generic 
reference to “the use of frameworks to assess elements of credit risk”.130 There is 
no dispute that more red flags amounts to more risk issues along the particular 
dimensions of risk addressed. So is Moody’s thereby expressing an opinion 
primarily concerned with creditworthiness using that framework? In other words, 
are the particulars of the statutory definition of “credit rating” satisfied? In the 
remainder of this Section and in Section 5 it is argued that it is not and that the 
RF Report is more sensibly regarded as a derivative report compiled for 
promotional purposes. 
 
4.3 Construing ‘credit rating’ 
 
The purposive approach as undertaken by the Tribunal (reviewed in Section 3) 
gave scant attention to the interpretation of the “credit rating” definition, the 
elements comprising the term, and the grammatical relationship between those 
elements. The Tribunal’s assessment of the term was as follows: 
 
“the phrase ‘credit ratings’ is broadly defined. The Legislature has not 
condescended to specific accountancy directives or mathematical 
formulae.. … It allows for different forms of credit ratings in respect of a 
range of subject matters. … [and] is broadly drafted so as to meet the 
exigencies of changing circumstances”131  
 
…“Understandably, therefore, the [SFO] defines ‘credit ratings’ as 
‘opinions’, that is, as views, judgments or beliefs, without any limitation to 
their form other than that they are ‘expressed’ using a ‘defined rankings 
system’, namely, a system that divides its subject matter into ranks or 
classes that are clearly specified” 132 
 
…[a defined ranking system] “may come in many forms; it may be self-
contained or it may be complementary to an existing system.” 133 
 
“it is also significant that the statutory definition does not limit the factors 
that may be taken into account in any such assessment [of debt 
obligations]” 134 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 BASEL IOSCO JOINT FORUM Page 4 
130 RF Report page 1 
131 Determination para 81 
132 Determination para 83 
133 Determination para 84 
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There is no doubt that the definition of “credit rating” is not concerned with the 
precise methodology involved in producing a rating. Under Hong Kong’s 
regulatory architecture, statute only concerns itself with the output of a rating 
process - does an item of information constitute a credit rating or not? Conduct 
aspects of the ratings process, including matters pertaining to methodology, are 
instead governed by non-statutory regulations, namely, the SFC CRA Code.135 
The non-statutory requirements remain specific notwithstanding that they also do 
not concern themselves with accounting directives or mathematical formulae. 
 
In Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 it is argued that the Tribunal’s brief assessment of 
“credit rating” has led to a misconstruction of it’s meaning both on an ordinary 
reading and having regard to the accepted practices of CRAs. 
 
4.3.1 Meaning of ‘using a defined ranking system’ 
 
To be a “credit rating” an opinion must be “expressed using a defined ranking 
system” (emphasis added). That is, the opinion expressed and the system used 
are related but nevertheless distinct. It would not be enough that the red flag 
framework was merely “a system that assessed elements of credit risk by a form 
of ranking.”136  
 
In Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd,137 
the Court noted the CRA in that case had “published a system of stand alone 
ratings where the relevant information for an investor was contained in the rating 
itself and the accompanying definition [the CRA] assigned to the rating.” 138 That 
is to say the ranking system is the defined scale of AAA, AA, etc. - it is not 
comprised in the CRA’s methodology, nor in any allocation of “markers” (such as 
red flags) that might be relevant to the CRA’s methodology. These distinctions, 
between the methodology, the ranking system, and the opinion expressed, also 
mean that once a rating has been given it “is not dependent on [the CRA’s] 
explanation of how it reached the rating.”139 
 
Unlike the opinion, which must concern creditworthiness, the phrase “defined 
ranking system” does not on a straightforward reading appear to mean that the 
system must rank creditworthiness per se. The SFC implicitly recognized this in 
their first consultation, noting that broker recommendations using a “‘buy, ‘hold’ 
or ‘sell’” is capable of being a defined ranking system.140 However, a reading of 
the phrase “defined ranking system” is arguably going to be blinkered if the 
preceding transitive verb “using” is ignored.  
 
According to common practices of the CRA industry, defined ranking systems are 
very often designed as an ordinal scale (although they might also come in other 
forms such as market credit spreads and market-implied credit ratings).141 It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Determination para 86 
135 Hong  Kong’s architecture in this regard is distinct from EU Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009 which itself deals with both the output and certain conduct matters in relation 
to its production (such as avoidance of conflicts of interest) 
136 Determination para 96 
137 (No 5) [2012] FCA 1200 (Federal Court of Australia) 
138 Ibid. at 1465 
139 Ibid. at 1464 
140 SFC’s “Consultation Paper Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, 19 July 2010, para 16 
141 See Herwig M. Langohr and Patricia T. Langohr, “The Rating Agencies and their Credit 
Ratings: What They Are, How They Work and Why They Are Relevant”, 2008 John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd page 43 
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hard to conceive how an opinion on creditworthiness under any ranking system 
can be expressed by using a system that is not sensitive to credit risk. One might 
put this another way: a ranking system that does not bear a statistically 
significant correlation with creditworthiness is likely to be of little use, if any, to 
forming and expressing an opinion on creditworthiness. Indeed, as Moody’s point 
out when introducing their red flag framework on page 1 of the RF Report, the 
correlation between the number of flags and creditworthiness is “limited” – some 
groupings of companies revealing a “lack of correlation”, others showing a 
“degree of correlation”.142 According to Moody’s, this shows that “screens for 
governance or accounting risks [i.e. the red flag framework] can help identify 
areas to investigate but cannot serve as mechanisms to rank order credit risk.”143 
That statement means the red flag framework cannot be employed as an ordinal 
system. 
 
The Tribunal interprets the non-correlation in a different manner, stating that it 
goes to the limitations of the framework but “does not go to the issue of whether 
a credit rating system… was presented in the report”.144 This presents a chicken-
and-egg conundrum and it is suggested that the Tribunal’s view must overcome 
the following five considerations that appear not well explored in its 
determination. 
 
First, the Tribunal appears to have come to its conclusion not through an isolated 
examination of the RF Report but via a review of various surrounding 
circumstances including the internal processes, intentions and expectations 
leading to the preparation and publication of the report, in particular, the 
discussions surrounding initial expectations and subsequent research findings. For 
reasons discussed in Section 3.2, this would appear to be a line of reasoning that 
lies outside the scope of Legislative intent.  
 
Second, as to whether a non-correlation goes to the limitation or the nature of 
the system, one needs to possess a basic appreciation of correlative statistics as 
a research tool in the social sciences. What is the import of the Tribunal citing the 
unexpected nature of the finding? That Moody’s may have originally anticipated 
the red flag framework would align with its opinions of creditworthiness reflects a 
reality of research endeavours: dealing with unexpected results is hardly 
abnormal and frequently informative. To describe this as implying that the 
framework is confused145 fails to recognize that reality.146 Rather, the statistic, if 
correctly calculated and disclosed (as appears to be the case), is simply 
something to be interpreted by the reader according to its own purposes.147  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
142 RF Report page 4 
143 RF Report page 1 
144 Determination para 97 
145 Per the SFC at Determination para 148 
146 While the Tribunal refer to various internal communications to assert a case of 
confusion and disagreement, the reality is that the exchange of differing views is a normal 
and healthy part of an organization and a research endeavour, and that such exchanges 
should not be subject to interpretation via a rear view mirror, or in any way suppressed 
(for example, for fear that a court might later reinterpret views). 
147 In a similar vein, the phrase “outlier” is a standard statistical term used to describe 
observations that depart materially from the bulk of a population of observations, the word 
“negative” merely indicating the directionality of the divergence. Accordingly, to describe 
the term “negative outlier” as “pejorative” is a failure to recognize the common language 
of statistics. However, Moody’s here departs from the statistical use of the term, 
apparently applying it on a selective and unexplained basis – many companies that 
triggered the same number of red flags as the “negative outliers” were not identified as 
such. This departure is likely to be of relevance to the question of whether the RF Report 
was misleading.  
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Third, Moody’s discussion of the non-correlation may serve as a means of 
distinguishing the red flag framework from Moody’s traditional credit ratings. The 
front page of the RF Report states “These findings … cannot serve as mechanisms 
to rank order credit risk.”148 On a plain reading that language distinguishes the 
red flag framework from its traditional credit ratings, which are, by contrast, 
pointedly arranged as ratings of credit risk within an ordinal system. The 
Tribunal’s reading of those words is anything but plain. 
 
Fourth, it needs to deal with the perimeter of where a framework is so materially 
limited as regards credit risk that it is not possible to express an opinion on 
creditworthiness, but merely hold oneself out as doing so. Since the SFC has 
previously identified “buy/sell/hold” as a defined ranking system, one might ask 
whether it can be used to express an opinion on creditworthiness. If a broker 
were to give such an opinion - e.g. “Based on our latest research report which 
has changed our ‘buy’ to a ‘sell’ recommendation, my opinion is that the 
company’s creditworthiness is trending down” - would this or could this be 
regarded as a credit rating? That it should not is at least consistent with the 
position of the SFC that “Advising on securities may include providing opinions on 
a company’s creditworthiness, but only as a factor impacting upon advice on 
whether … securities [i.e. equity or debt] should be acquired or disposed of.”149 It 
would not be a surprising conclusion, nor one that is inconsistent with the 
purposes of regulating CRAs, that the definition of credit rating implies or requires 
that the ranking system on which an opinion is based must somehow be capable 
of being used for ranking creditworthiness - that it be designed or targeted to 
measure credit risk, not merely some broader range of concerns of which 
creditworthiness may or may not be but one consideration.150 Section 6.1 below 
discusses the ramifications of drawing the definition of credit rating too widely. 
 
Fifth, it requires the nature of the RF Report to be established as an opinion 
“primarily regarding” creditworthiness.  
 
4.3.2 Meaning of ‘primarily regarding’ 
 
There is not, quite surprisingly, any discussion in the Tribunal’s determination of 
the import of these two words in the definition. The phrase does not appear to be 
used in any other statute of Hong Kong, nor subject to prior judicial 
interpretation.151 Given the international context of introducing CRA regulation in 
Hong Kong, it is also of interest to note that neither the U.S. or the EU legislation, 
nor IOSCO’s Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies 
incorporates such a requirement.152 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 RF Report page 1 
149 SFC’s “Consultation Paper Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, 19 July 2010, para 16 
150 EU Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 avoids the “buy/sell/hold” problem by specifically 
providing, in Article Article 3, 2(b), that such recommendations shall not be considered 
credit ratings 
151 Search conducted for the phrase “primarily regarding” on the database of the Hong 
Kong Legal Information Institute, July 2016 
152 s3(a)(60) of the Exchange Act provides “The term ‘credit rating’ means an assessment 
of the creditworthiness of an obligor as an entity or with respect to specific securities or 
money market instruments. 15 USC 78c (a)(60) provides “The term ‘credit rating’ means 
an assessment of the creditworthiness of an obligor as an entity or with respect to specific 
securities or money market instruments.” The EU defines it as “an opinion regarding the 
creditworthiness of an entity [etc.]”. The IOSCO Code provides “’Credit rating’ or ‘rating’ 
means an assessment regarding the creditworthiness of an entity or obligation, expressed 
using an established and defined ranking system.” 
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The natural language use of the phrase suggests the Legislature intended to 
distinguish between reports predominantly concerned with an evaluation of 
creditworthiness, and reports that are not. However, the presence and plain 
meaning of these additional words cannot simply be ignored.153 
 
The Legislature might have wanted to include these additional words this as part 
of the need to establish, as the Tribunal noted, a bright line between regulated 
and non-regulated activities, or between credit ratings from research reports that 
contain elements relevant to credit risk.154 There is obviously an enormous 
volume of published materials discussing the shortcomings of corporates that 
may be relevant to assessments of creditworthiness but which are typically not 
considered to be discussions of risk of default. They are instead characterized as, 
for example, research reports, or perhaps discussions of corporate sustainability. 
Default may be a potential consequence of bad risk governance, but a discussion 
of bad risk governance, even if based around a ranking system, does not 
necessarily amount to an assessment of the risk of default. The SFC itself uses 
indicators such as “companies with history of losses, frequent corporate 
restructuring, changes of auditors” to assess corporate risk and to “identify red 
flags”.155 These regulatory concerns are confluent with the interests of investors 
generally. It follows that the concerns of the RF Report - governance and 
accounting risks, which are matters equally of interest to equity investors - does 
not of in and of itself render the discussion primarily regarding creditworthiness. 
As already noted, it is not sufficient that a credit-related usage might emerge 
from the RF Report. Something more is required.  
 
With these distinctions in mind, the perimeter of the phrase ‘primarily regarding” 
can be considered.  
 
That which clearly falls within the perimeter 
 
As already discussed in Section 4.2, credit ratings (such as those traditionally 
issued by Moody’s under their usual ratings classifications156) are not themselves 
the creditworthiness - the credit rating, being an opinion on creditworthiness, 
points to creditworthiness. The rating is the signifier, the creditworthiness the 
signified. The rating is typically expressed as being one of a set of ranked 
symbols or icons used by the CRA. The issuer of the rating seeks to facilitate a 
shared or common understanding of what meaning each rating rank is intended 
to convey by providing a specific definition of each rating. Such statements are 
not only long standing industry practice but are also required by regulations.157 
To illustrate by way of example, one might look at the definitions used in Moody’s 
baseline credit assessments (“BCAs”) of corporates being “opinions of issuers’ 
standalone intrinsic strength, absent any extraordinary support from an affiliate 
or a government” so, for example, a BCA rating of ‘aaa’ means: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 See Lord Millett NPJ in China Field Ltd v Appeal Tribunal (Buildings) [2009] HKCFA 95; 
[2009] 5 HKLRD 662; (2009) 12 HKCFAR 342; [2009] 5 HKC 231; FACV 2/2009 (30 
October 2009) at 36 
154 Determination para 206 
155 Carlson Tong, SFC’s Chairman, in a speech titled “Towards better corporate 
governance” at the Chamber of Hong Kong Listed Companies 11th anniversary gala 
dinner, 12 December 2013. The full speech is available at 
http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/ER/PDF/Speeches/Carlson%2020131212.pdf 
156 See generally “Rating symbols an definitions”, Moody’s Investors Service, May 2016 
157 For example, para 54 of the SFC CRA Code requires a CRA to “clearly define a given 
rating symbol and apply it in a consistent manner” 
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“Issuers assessed aaa are judged to have the highest intrinsic, or 
standalone, financial strength, and thus subject to the lowest level of 
credit risk absent any possibility of extraordinary support from an affiliate 
or a government”  
 
whereas a rating of caa means: 
 
“Issuers assessed caa are judged to have speculative intrinsic, or 
standalone, financial strength, and are subject to very high credit risk 
absent any possibility of extraordinary support from an affiliate or a 
government.”158 
 
The uses to which a particular rating is put will vary according to each user's 
needs whether lender, investor or regulatory body. Equity investors may also 
choose to use them. However, different potential usages do not change the 
intended relationship between the specific credit rating issued and 
creditworthiness, nor the breadth of the rating’s intended meaning.  
 
In short, credit ratings, by their nature and as normally understood, do not 
signify a broad, and possibly ill-defined, range of other potential meanings. They 
are quite specific. 
 
That which is not primarily regarding creditworthiness 
 
General opinions and views on equity or other matters concerning the company 
not addressing creditworthiness clearly fall outside the perimeter.  
 
As a negative definition (“not primarily”), the scope of the matters that fall 
outside the perimeter are wider than what falls within it. Many things are 
potentially covered. Reports appraising a range of corporate issues, some of 
which might also be of interest to a person interested in the question of 
creditworthiness, would need to be regarded as falling outside this perimeter if 
creditworthiness was not its primary focus. 
 
Categories defined negatively are by their nature perilous to define. However, an 
application of the law to the RF Report does not require this to be done. Rather, it 
requires a case to be proven that the report falls within the perimeter of 
“primarily regarding”.  
 
The Tribunal has considered a number of surrounding circumstances to suggest 
that Moody’s primary focus in preparing the report was driven by and ultimately 
pertained to its interest, as a CRA, in creditworthiness. This conclusion in itself 
seems not untrue.159  
 
Bearing in mind the nature of the relationship between rating as signifier and 
creditworthiness as signified, another way of addressing the question of primacy 
is to ask whether a report is capable of giving rise to this relationship. Although 
credit ratings may have a different information value to different users of 
them,160 it nevertheless seems impossible to say that a report is primarily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 “Rating symbols an definitions”, Moody’s Investors Service, May 2016, page 29-30 
159 Section 3.2 above argued that surrounding circumstances are not legally determinative 
of the nature of the report itself. Rather, the RF Report must be considered plainly and 
directly. 
160 DW Arner et al, “Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in Hong Kong: Lessons from the 
Global Financial Crisis” Banking & Finance Law Review 25.3 (Jun 2010), 361-403, page 
364 
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concerned with creditworthiness if nothing in the report clearly points to 
creditworthiness, i.e., if there is an absence of the signifier-signified relationship. 
 
The red flag framework, to operate as a signifier of creditworthiness, should be 
capable of giving rise to a common understanding of what a particular number of 
red flags assigned to a company means in terms of its creditworthiness. For 
example, it should make sense to ask “What is the credit rating of company X 
and Y in the RF Report?”, and a commonly understood answer pertaining to 
creditworthiness capable of being given. It is not clear from the Tribunal’s 
determination whether evidence was gathered on this question. Some scant and 
inconclusive evidence from the media and one research report is cited.161  
 
The Tribunal’s own view was that “a company allocated 20 red flags represented, 
on any ordinary reading, the maximum potential credit risk; a company allocated 
none at all represented the minimum potential credit risk” (emphasis added).162 
This implicitly assumes ordinality in the way the scale works.  
 
However, an accurate answer to the question asked above might be: “X has 
seven red flags and Y has only five”. Such an answer does not provide an 
indication of the opinion on creditworthiness of X or Y, nor is it capable of 
indicating an opinion on the comparative creditworthiness of X or Y - not least 
since, as Moody’s states in the RF Report, all flags are not equally weighted.163 
For this reason, an alternative answer to the question such as “X is less 
creditworthy that Y because X has more red flags than Y” is also not sensible to 
give - the ordinality required to enable one to do so is lacking.164 An accurate 
answer to the question would therefore appear to fall well short of the basic 
requirement that a credit rating should, in the words of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, “be a credible assessment of the relative creditworthiness 
of an obligor or obligation.”165 
 
To the extent different users may interpret166 the total number of red flags as 
meaning different things, there is no common understanding of the framework 
capable of giving rise to the relationship of signifier (the rating) and signified 
(creditworthiness). The relationship discussed above, wherein a rating points to 
creditworthiness via an opinion or assessment that has been expressed in the 
rating, fails to form. To assert that the red flag framework primarily points to 
creditworthiness assumes a defined rating system that does not appear to be 
supported by the facts of the RF Report. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Market Watch, an industry focused website operated by Dow Jones, in paras 34-35; 
Apple Daily, a Hong Kong newspaper, in para 36; Wall Street Journal, in para 43. The 
research report is from Macquarie Equities Research, at para 43 
162 Determination para 29 
163 RF Report page 3, first new para 
164 “Ordinality implies that all ratings along [an ordinal credit rating] scale are 
comparable.” See Herwig M. Langohr and Patricia T. Langohr, “The Rating Agencies and 
their Credit Ratings: What They Are, How They Work and Why They Are Relevant”, 2008 
John Wiley & Sons Ltd, page 43 
165 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-72936; File No. S7-18-11 
dated 10/14/14, page 436. This document adopts various amendments pursuant to Title 
IX, Subtitle C of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
concerning “Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies” amongst other 
things 
166 I.e. and not merely use the framework for different purposes 
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A deficient rating? 
 
The counterargument, reflecting the position of the SFC and the Tribunal, is that 
the failure of the RF Report to provide definitions, detailed methodologies and so 
on to amount to a credible assessment, does not operate to make it not a credit 
rating but instead serves to make it one that is deficient. Accordingly, it fails to 
meet the standards and requirements of the SFC’s codes. 
 
In this vein the Tribunal suggested that “educated readers … would have treated 
the red flag framework as a ‘screen’ to enable them to be given extra insight into 
Moody’s established systems” in the sense of it being “used to fine tune Moody’s 
credit ratings”.167 Such an understanding ignores the observation made in the 
Bathurst168 case that a rating once given is not dependent on a CRA’s subsequent 
explanation of how it reached the rating, may be overly simplistic, highly 
presumptive of the approach of an educated reader, and difficult to establish. The 
Tribunal itself identifies one publication that recognizes the distinction that “the 
warnings were short of credit downgrades”169 and a number of market 
commentators have expressed surprise or dismay that the RF Report has been 
regarded as a credit rating. 
 
The RF Report: (1) expressly points out, as already discussed, that the correlation 
between the red flags and existing credit ratings of creditworthiness is limited; 
(2) accordingly does not provide any definitions, for example, that a certain 
number of flags means such-and-such as regards creditworthiness – there would 
be no sense in doing so given the lack of correlation; (3) states that a corporate’s 
“tripping of many red flags does not represent an immediate rating concern”170 
and (4) indicates that although flags operate rather generically as “warning 
signs”171 applied on an “equal weighting” basis, some may be deemed more 
important than others172 – i.e. all red flags are not equal. An example of the latter 
is Moody’s discussion of a red flag triggered as a result of a CEO’s change of 
position which Moody’s regards as “positive because it split the role of chairman 
and CEO”.173  
 
If, notwithstanding the foregoing, one imagines that a lay person or ill-informed 
reader looks at the red flags as a simple counter of governance and accounting 
risks that reveals creditworthiness of a particular issuer, e.g. that an issuer with 
five flags is more creditworthy than one with seven, it should be noted that the 
Tribunal is not obligated to adopt the same non sequitur. 
 
4.4 Conclusions on the construal of “credit rating” 
 
The Tribunal’s broad-brush approach to the meaning of “credit rating” glosses 
over important differences between elements that pertain to, inter alia, credit risk 
and the opinion that is expressed on creditworthiness. It may also be at odds 
with the approach taken in the SFC CRA Code, the overall tenor of which appears 
to regard credit ratings as something specific. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Determination para 162 
168 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] 
FCA 1200 op. cit. 
169 Market Watch, 12 July 2011, as cited in Determination para 34. However, the Tribunal 
goes on to conflate the subsequent Market Watch comments as being pertinent to a 
consideration of the nature of the RF Report, as discussed in Section 4.1 above. 
170 RF Report page 4 
171 RF Report page 2 
172 RF Report page 3, first new para 
173 RF Report page 5, in the discussion of West China Cement 
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For the reasons set out above and in Section 3, that approach is intimately tied 
up with what appears to be the wrong starting point for the analysis of the RF 
Report leading to what is effectively an inverted analysis of the issuance and 
nature of the RF Report.  
 
The terms reviewed in Section 4.3 above do carry specific meanings that reflect 
these distinctions and the practices of the CRA industry, and serve to keep 
distinct the rating products of CRAs from other information-providing 
functionalities in the market. 
 
It is therefore suggested that Moody's description of the framework as "an 
interesting screen to identify potential areas of concern for follow up and closer 
scrutiny”174 is more consistent with the RF Report falling outside the tight 
perimeter of “primarily regarding”. It is well capable of signifying a range of 
concerns of which creditworthiness is just one.  
 
However, there is one more approach taken by the Tribunal that has not been 
attended to in within the specific focus of this Section and which requires 
consideration: the argument that the RF Report supplements or amplifies Moody’s 
traditional credit ratings, and that by doing so it promotes the information value 
of those ratings (although which particular ratings is not made clear by the 
Tribunal) and consequently the usefulness of Moody’s ratings to the users 
thereof. As such, the RF Report becomes part of Moody’s existing credit ratings. 
That argument is discussed in Section 5. 
 
5. CONSTRUING THE RF REPORT AS PART AND PARCEL OF MOODY’S 
OTHER CREDIT RATINGS 	  
The Tribunal’s alternative determination that the RF Report is “part and parcel of 
Moody’s ratings themselves”175 relies in large part on Moody’s press release, in 
particular the use of the word “supplemental” therein (the concerns over using 
the press release in the analysis of the RF Report have already been discussed in 
Section 3.2.3). The press release states that: 176 
 
“The [red flag] framework is supplemental to Moody's methodological 
approach to rating non-financial corporates in the emerging markets, and 
is aimed at highlighting discreet risks that may warrant further 
investigation” (emphasis added). 
 
The Tribunal cites the press release as important to the link between the RF 
Report and Type 10 regulated activity: 
 
“Moody’s accepted… although there was a link… there being no exact 
correlation… the red flag system had to be something more than a mere 
illustration of Moody’s existing ratings. As the press release announced, 
the red flags were ‘supplemental’ to Moody’s existing ratings: adding to 
them and/or amplifying them.”177  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 RF Report page 2 
175 Determination para 102 
176 The press release can be found at Moody’s web site. 
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Accounting-and-governance-warning-signs-
for-emerging-market-companies--PR_222323 
177 Determination para 32. The reference to the statement on page 4 of the RF Report: “An 
issuer’s tripping of many red flags does not represent an immediate rating concern 
because our ratings already reflect many of the issues highlighted by the relevant red 
flags, and the ratings also incorporate more than just the potential concerns that the flags 
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The reference to the RF Report being “supplemental” is used only once in the 
press release and not at all in the RF Report. Nevertheless, the Tribunal gives the 
word considerable attention178 as part of its argument that the RF Report is 
intended to amplify and becomes part of Moody’s credit ratings. 
 
5.1 “Supplemental to” 
 
The meaning of the phrase “supplemental to” is reasonably straightforward – it is 
something that forms or serves as a supplement, i.e. a thing: 
 
“added to make good a deficiency or as an enhancement; an addition or 
continuation to remedy or compensate for inadequacies; … [a] part added 
to complete or extend a literary work or any written account or 
document”.179 
 
The Tribunal appears to have read “supplemental” (1) against Moody’s existing 
credit ratings, and in a (2) negative or (3) transformational manner. None of 
these readings seem warranted, as explained below. 
 
5.1.1 The subject is methodology 
 
Although the press release states it is Moody’s “methodological approach to 
rating” that is being supplemented, the Tribunal instead reads the statement as 
supplemental to Moody’s credit ratings: 
 
“As the press release announced, the red flags were “supplemental” to 
Moody’s existing ratings: adding to them and/or amplifying them.”180 
 
This is a plain misreading of the press release that again reflects a failure on the 
part of the Tribunal to recognize important distinctions, well recognized in the 
CRA industry, between credit risk, creditworthiness, and credit ratings (discussed 
in Section 4.2). As already noted in Section 4.3.1, methodology, the ranking 
system, and the opinion expressed are separate and distinct matters. 
Methodology is merely an intermediate matter, a set of established tasks applied 
to credit risk factors. Methodology and any discussion of it clearly is not a rating 
opinion, and neither can it be an explanation or qualification of any rating 
decision that previously made. In brief, a discussion that references methodology 
is not thereby a discussion of a rating opinion. Again referencing the Bathurst 
case, a rating “is not dependent on [a CRA’s] explanation of how it reached the 
rating” because “the relevant information for an investor [is] contained in the 
rating itself and the accompanying definition [the CRA] assigned to the rating.”181	  
 
5.1.2 Negative reading 
 
The Tribunal refers to ‘supplemental’ as implying the RF Report is “amplifying”182 
Moody’s credit ratings. To amplify is to enhance, enlarge, or expatiate. This 
seems, in the view of the Tribunal, to be necessitated by changing market 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
capture. Moreover, as indicated, there is only limited correlation between lower ratings and 
a higher number of red flags tripped.” 
178 Determination paras 21, 32, 82, 102, 103, 146, 147, 148, 159, 161, 164 and 192 
179 Oxford English Dictionary Third Edition June 2012 
180 Determination para 32 
181 Bathurst Regional Council v Local Government Financial Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2012] 
FCA 1200 (Federal Court of Australia) at 1464 and 1465 
182 Determination para 32 
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conditions that require credit ratings “to be clarified, supplemented or made 
subject to change.”183  
 
While one can agree with the general statement that ratings are subject to 
change over time, it is a significant and unfounded leap to suggest that the RF 
Report serves this purpose and that (by implication) without it, Moody’s existing 
ratings would be somehow deficient or possibly in need of clarification. Moody’s 
has well-established means, presumably consistent with the SFC’s codes, to 
update and revise its published ratings when necessary to do so. Those means 
are quite distinct from the tenor of the RF Report and are clearly identified as 
updates to credit ratings. 
 
It remains unclear on what basis the Tribunal has chosen to lend “supplemental 
to” the meaning it has, when other meanings are available. The Sunday 
newspaper that comes with a “Sunday Supplement” does not imply that the news 
in the main part of the paper is itself deficient or in need of clarification. It merely 
puts more information on the breakfast table, though one expects to read more 
about cultural interests than the latest views on Brexit. 
 
The SFC itself provides an example of a usage that does not imply any negative 
implication of deficiency in the thing being supplemented. The SFC CRA Code 
states that it “supplements, and should be read in conjunction with”184 the SFC 
General Code. This reflects the fact that the two codes serve different purposes, 
the former dealing with matters not addressed in the latter code. The SFC’s 
guidance to read one in conjunction with the other is of course additional to the 
word “supplement”. Similarly, the SFO and other ordinances in Hong Kong make 
generous use of the word ‘supplement’ in a purely additive sense to provide for 
supplemental orders, provisions, regulations and other arrangements that imply 
no shortcoming in the underlying ordinance. 
 
Moody’s existing credit ratings have at no time been called into question (by the 
Tribunal or others) as to their sufficiency for the purposes they serve. 
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing considerations, any negative reading of 
“supplemental to” would appear to be spurious. 
 
5.1.3 Transformational reading 
 
For one thing to be supplemental to another thing also does not render it the 
same as that which it is supplementing. The Tribunal states that: 
 
“it is evident that [the red flag framework] was intended to be read as 
amplifying and supplementing Moody’s ratings, as being so intimately 
attendant upon them that it constituted more than mere comment and 
became part and parcel of Moody’s ratings themselves” (emphasis 
added).185  
 
“If readers were to understand the red flag framework to be supplemental, 
it would follow that they were effectively being provided with analysis in 
some respects at least additional to Moody’s existing ratings” (emphasis 
added).186 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Determination para 82 
184 SFC CRA Code, para 2 
185 Determination para 102 
186 Determination para 147 
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As per the example already provided under Section 5.1.2 above, the SFC’s usage 
does not make the SFC CRA Code part and parcel of the SFC General Code. Each 
continues to serve its own particular purposes, and each possesses an area of 
mutual concern in which they overlap. 
 
To illustrate the foregoing it is useful to give an example: 
 
(A) “Dan’s biometric measuring system of Jack indicates he is 180 cm tall 
and weights 120 kilograms giving him a body mass index of around 34. 
According to Dan’s defined ranking system, which is based on criteria 
provided by the World Health Organization, this means that Jack is obese.”  
 
Dan subsequently supplements her data with two additional facts: 
 
(B) “Jack is from Mississippi. Jack is a Christian.”  
 
That Jack is from Mississippi and a Christian clearly does not make those matters 
part of Dan’s biometric system, nor does it affect her defined ranking system. 
There is nevertheless a relevance of Jack coming from Mississippi: it has one of 
the highest rates of obesity in the U.S. On the other hand, that Jack is a Christian 
is a fact that might have some correlation with the prevailing religious beliefs in 
Mississippi but possibly limited correlation with obesity rates.  
 
Dan’s supplemental data in (B), and the attendant correlations and non-
correlations of course do not make the biometrician’s data in (A) wrong, deficient 
or confused in any way. They supplement it with additional information that may 
be of interest to readers of Dan’s biometric reports for a variety of reasons. 
However, they do not change or become ‘part and parcel’ of Dan’s biometric 
system.  
 
Ill-informed users of Dan’s data set (i.e. (A) and (B)) may of course come to 
erroneous conclusions based on a poor understanding of statistics, a problem that 
is not an uncommon one.187 	  
5.2 An alternative interpretation 
 
Expressed plainly, the argument presented above means that one can say 
something extra about existing information to supplement it, but it does not 
follow that the something extra is the same in nature as the information it is 
supplementing or that it changes the existing information in any way. 
 
The debt-oriented leaning of both the RF Report and the press release are 
consistent with a commercial entity that wishes to highlight matters of potential 
interest to its primary client base. CRAs often issue unsolicited materials to 
improve the market coverage of the ratings188 without such materials thereby 
being regarded as credit ratings (see the discussion in Section 3.3). 
 
The RF Report noted investor concerns over the discussion in the U.S. of 
“potential problems with the quality of financial reporting from publicly listed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 As extensivley illustrated in Steven Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner “Freakonomics: A 
Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything.” 2005 William Morrow/Harper 
Collins 2005 
188 A Duff and S Einig “Credit rating agencies: meeting the needs of the market?”, The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 2007, page 14 
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Chinese companies”.189 Accounting risks, a matter of concern to a wide group of 
persons, was an important subject of the RF Report.  
 
Indeed, the opening sentences of Moody’s press release reflects the foregoing: 
 
“Moody's Investors Service highlights, in a new report, governance and 
accounting risks prevalent when investing in fixed-income securities in the 
emerging markets. … the 20-point framework is applied to Chinese non-
financial corporates, wherein recent credit events have seriously de-
stabilized investor appetite for paper in this market.”190 
 
That Moody’s may have wanted to specifically position the report in a credit-
related space is consistent with the desire of a for-profit organization to engage 
with its clients by generating discussion and interaction (the RF Report is a paid-
for report). Investors tend to see ratings as indicators of internal risk 
management, an issue of importance to them.191 A CRA also typically considers 
factors relevant to internal risk management (such as corporate governance and 
accounting issues) as a factor in its rating methodology. However, as discussed in 
Section 4.2, a report that discusses internal risk management – useful to a CRA’s 
client base – does not of itself give rise to a credit rating.  
 
Moody’s positioning of the RF Report is also consistent with its desire to “create 
value for all users of our credit ratings” and to “prioritize … transparency thought 
leadership.”192 However, as with the other extrinsic factors discussed in Section 3, 
these considerations are circumstantial in nature and are not determinative of the 
nature of the RF Report for the purposes of the SFO. 
 
6. MEETING POLICY OBJECTIVES 
 
As already noted, the interpretation of legislative intent is based primarily on the 
language used in the legislation and having regard to the public policy intent of 
the legislation. An interpretation of the legislation which stymies that purpose193 
would prima facie be in error, particularly if other valid interpretations, or 
solutions to an alleged wrongdoing, are available. The same may be said of an 
interpretation that is inconsistent with the regulatory objectives of the legislation 
and its statutory regulator or Hong Kong’s Basic Law.194 
 
Whereas Sections 3 to 5 queried the syntax of the Tribunal’s argument and its 
approach to statutory interpretation, the following sections suggest that the 
determination may also be interrogated as to whether it is counterproductive to 
the policy intent of the Legislature.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 RF Report page 2 
190 Press release dated 11 July 2011, the same date as the RF Report 
191 A Duff and S Einig “Credit rating agencies: meeting the needs of the market?”, The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 2007, page 35-36 
192 See Moody’s Annual Report 2015, page 4 
193 The context of introducing CRA regulatory oversight in Hong Kong has already been 
discussed – see Section 1.2 above 
194 While Section 4 of the SFO sets out the regulatory objectives of the SFC, Article 109 of 
the Basic Law states: “The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
shall provide an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the 
status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre.” This is reflected in Section 
6(2)(a) of the SFO which requires the SFC, in pursuing its objectives and functions, to 
have regard to “the international character of the securities and futures industry and the 
desirability of maintaining the status of Hong Kong as a competitive international financial 
centre”. 
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Section 6.1 considers the potential issues that could arise domestically and 
internationally should the Court of Appeal uphold the Tribunal’s determination. 
Section 6.2 reviews the other provisions of the SFO relevant to the question of 
the legislation meeting legislative intent. 
 
6.1 Ramifications of the determination 
 
6.1.1 Local implications 
 
The determination presents four main issues the market would need to grapple 
with. 
 
First, the perimeter of what constitutes Type 10 regulated activity becomes less 
clear.  
 
The Tribunal’s reading of “credit rating” as being broadly defined creates 
uncertainty as to what is to be regarded as a credit rating and, therefore, when 
an information provider might be regarded as issuing a credit rating and so 
engaging in Type 10 regulated activity. Contra the analysis presented in this 
paper, information could possibly be regarded as a credit rating notwithstanding 
that creditworthiness is not its primary concern, it lacks ordinality, and the 
ranking system could not sensibly be used to rank creditworthiness. In addition, a 
variety of unspecified surrounding or extrinsic circumstances could also become 
relevant. Taken together, this represents a significant blurring of the clear 
perimeter sought by the SFO, regulators and market participants between 
different types of regulated and unregulated activities. The concerns of the SFC 
expressed during the consultations leading to the statutory CRA regime to 
“effectively distinguish between Type 4 and Type 10 regulated activities”195 is, per 
Chief Justice Li, relevant to consider to identify the purpose of the legislation. 196  
The Tribunal’s determination, however, gives rise to some uncertainties as to 
what counts as research product and what counts as the special category of 
credit rating, and whether some persons licensed for Type 4 regulated activity 
might additionally need to be licensed for Type 10. This might lead to certain 
types of reports not previously regarded as credit ratings requiring re-
examination. Existing regulated intermediaries will need to review their 
compliance procedures as to the management of information noting that 
disclaimers accompanying the information might not be of assistance. It may also 
make the Hong Kong market less attractive to potential information-providing 
market participants, including those looking to base new operations in Asia. 
 
Second, the implications for a CRA holding or considering obtaining a Type 10 
license in Hong Kong appear to change. 
 
In consequence of the first point above, licensed CRAs and those CRAs 
considering obtaining a license in Hong Kong, would need to revisit the question 
of which of their activities are to be regarded as subject to the regulatory 
oversight of the SFC. The Moody’s case suggests the Type 10 license could in 
effect become a proxy for the SFC to regulate a wider range of activities 
undertaken by CRAs than currently understood. To the extent the scope of a 
more inclusive oversight is uncertain, regulatory clarity is warranted. A 
broadening of regulatory oversight would also introduce new compliance burdens 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 SFC’s “Consultation Conclusions Concerning the Regulatory Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies”, 29 October 2010, para 22 
196 At para 14 of Cheung Kwun Yin op. cit.: "Where the legislation in question implements 
the recommendations of a report, such as a Law Reform Commission report, the report 
may be referred to in order to identify the purpose of the legislation.”  
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for CRAs. To the extent these developments may be out of step with the 
approach taken internationally (see Section 6.1.2) Hong Kong may become a less 
competitive market for CRAs to base themselves. 
 
Third, the disciplinary provisions of the SFO appear to be widened in an uncertain 
and uneven manner.  
 
The concerns noted in the second point above are magnified when one considers, 
as noted in Section 3.3 above, the uncertainty created by the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of “relating to the carrying on of any regulated activity”197 in the 
disciplinary provisions of the SFO. This is a concern not only for CRAs but also for 
all regulated intermediaries, namely, as to when a non-regulated activity is to be 
regarded as “relating to” one of their regulated activities and when it is not. 
Interpreting the phrase the way the Tribunal has done in effect extends the SFC’s 
disciplinary powers to acts undertaken by regulated intermediaries even though 
such acts are not themselves regulated activities. This arguably extends the 
perimeter of regulatory oversight of the SFC in a way not intended by the 
Legislature. Since unregulated persons undertaking exactly the same acts need 
not be concerned, it is contended that an uneven playing field is created. 
 
Fourth, as a result of the foregoing, is the potential consequence of the widening 
of a CRA’s liability.  
 
While the credit rating industry and the more recent developments in subjecting 
CRAs to regulatory oversight operate to reduce information asymmetries in the 
market198 the Tribunal’s determination could be counterproductive. Some market 
commentators in Hong Kong have already noted that the Tribunal’s determination 
may have far reaching effects on the freedom of information, particularly 
negative criticism, in the market. This may work to constrain the business and 
information-providing activities of not only CRAs but also others who provide 
advice and issue research. This could result in a reduction of the range of views 
being expressed in the market on matters such as quality of financial reporting, a 
company’s business strategy, or its corporate governance standards. Over a 
decade ago Moody’s submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
that increasing legal liability “would also have the ultimate chilling effect on our 
ability to publish independent and potentially controversial opinions.”199 The 
Tribunal’s determination effectively widens that concern to other information 
providers in the market.  
 
6.1.2 International context 
 
As discussed in Section 1.2, an essential element in the design and 
implementation of Hong Kong’s CRA regulatory regime was that ratings in Hong 
Kong should be serviceable in the EU. The EU has recognized Hong Kong’s legal 
and supervisory framework as equivalent to the requirements of the EU subject 
to three conditions that are to be met on a continuing basis (the “EU equivalence 
decision”). The European Commission, informed by the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (“ESMA”), will “continue to monitor the evolution of the Hong 
Kong legal and supervisory framework for CRAs”.200 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Section 193(1)(d). Emphasis added 
198 See generally DW Arner et al, “Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in Hong Kong: 
Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis” Banking & Finance Law Review 25.3 (Jun 2010), 
361-403 
199 Moody’s letter dated 28 July 2003 in response to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s “File No. S7-12-03, Concept Release: Rating Agencies  
and the Use of Credit Ratings under the Federal Securities Laws”, page 4 
200 Official Journal of the European Union, vol 57, 3 May 2014, page 77 
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The EU equivalence decision is premised on ESMA’s technical advice that “the 
Hong Kong legal and supervisory framework in respect of CRAs is comparable to 
that laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009.” 201 Article 3, 1(a) of that 
regulation defines credit rating as meaning 
 
“an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a debt or financial 
obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, or 
of an issuer of such a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred 
share or other financial instrument, issued using an established and 
defined ranking system of rating categories”. 
 
While there are obvious differences in the precise language used in the EU and 
Hong Kong definitions, ESMA’s advice regarded the two as comparable. That 
assessment was made at a time when no statutory body or Court of law (in Hong 
Kong or elsewhere) had been asked to determine or rule on the precise scope of 
the statutorily defined terms. If the effect of the Tribunal’s determination, or a 
subsequent Court ruling, was to represent a significant departure from the 
understanding of ESMA or the European Commission, this may suggest that a 
generally consistent approach has not developed in Hong Kong and conceivably 
could require a reassessment of Hong Kong’s continued equivalence.  
 
Accordingly, it becomes necessary to ask the following question: has the 
understanding in Hong Kong of what constitutes a credit rating been widened202 
in such a way that might cause information being regarded as a credit rating in 
Hong Kong that would not be regarded as such in the EU? If such an equivalence-
gap arises, a central purpose of Hong Kong’s CRA regime is at risk of failure. 
 
One might rephrase the problem more specifically: would the issue of the RF 
Report or the red flag framework would be regarded for the purposes of EU 
regulation as that of a credit rating agency issuing a credit rating? If the answer 
is no and a Hong Kong Court ruling nevertheless supports the broad 
interpretation of the Tribunal, this would appear to confirm a problematic 
equivalence-gap exists that the European Commission may be obliged to 
consider. 
 
The increased uncertainty of the CRA regime as suggested in Section 6.1.1 and 
the foregoing equivalence concern together appears to be at odds with Hong 
Kong’s status as a leading international financial centre.203 
 
To the extent such a conflict between regimes exists, Hong Kong regulators and 
policymakers should note that the concluding section to IOSCO’s Final Report on 
“Regulatory Implementation of the Statement of Principles Regarding the 
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies” requires that they “should seek timely and 
reasonable accommodations so long as the IOSCO principles are not 
compromised.”204 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Official Journal of the European Union, vol 57, 3 May 2014, page 76 
202 I.e., along the lines of the term being “broadly defined” (Determination para 81) as the 
Tribunal would have it 
203 It is at odds with the role of the Hong Kong government under Article 109 of the Basic 
Law to maintain, and the duties of the SFC under section 6(2)(a) of the SFO to have 
regard to, Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre, and with the duties of 
the SFC  
204 Final Report FR04/11, February 2011, at page 38 
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6.2 Other provisions of the SFO are relevant 
 
Whatever the credit rating status of the RF Report, it remains a piece of 
information that has been distributed into the market and, fundamentally, the 
SFC’s case against Moody’s is based on the report being “unfair, unclear and 
misleading”.205 The Tribunal also found that the RF Report was misleading206 
(although this aspect has not been a focus of this paper207).  
 
If one considers whether the legislative intent of protecting market integrity from 
misinformation (and unregulated participants208) is met by the SFO, it is not 
necessary to look to the CRA regime – other provisions of the SFO specifically 
deal with that. The Tribunal is of course limited to the matters relevant to the 
SFC’s findings and is not able to consider those other provisions directly.209 
However, it is within its remit to consider them in the context of statutory 
interpretation.  
 
The following brief discussion illustrates the SFO does not lack other mechanisms 
that provide effective sanctions and remedies in relation to the SFC’s base case 
against Moody’s. As such, a broadening of the scope of the CRA regime is 
questionable insofar as it seems unnecessary to meet the overall objectives of the 
legislation. 
 
The SFO provides for criminal210, administrative211 and civil212 sanctions in respect 
of the negligent213, reckless or intentional dissemination of false or misleading 
information likely to induce transactions.214 These provisions in general apply to 
all providers of information,215 whether or not regulated by the SFC. CRAs have 
no particular immunity from such provisions and Moody’s may be exposed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 SFC enforcement news, 5 April 2016. In the SFC’s Notice of Proposed Disciplinary 
Action, it “informed Moody’s that it was of the preliminary view that the Report (and its 
related press release) contained misleading, inaccurate and unfair statements.” As cited by 
the Tribunal in Determination para 45 
206 Determination para 177 
207 Aspects of the Tribunal’s understanding of the non-correlation aspects of the report 
have been questioned in Section 4 and suggest a re-reading of the report is required that 
is independent of Moody’s status as a CRA. 
208 As regards regulated activities, if the RF Report is not a credit rating does it mean 
Moody's has engaged in some other regulated activity, such as Type 4 (advising on 
securities), when it distributed the report (or other reports like it)? This would require a 
different analysis from the one undertaken in this paper, namely, whether the statutory 
definition briefly discussed in Section 3.2.1 is satisfied. If it was, then Moody's would be 
conducting regulated activity without a license which is a criminal offence under section 
114(1)(a) of the SFO. However, this seems unlikely having regard to the nature of the RF 
Report, the special role of CRAs and their business analyses, and the wider consequences 
of any such finding. 
209 Determination para 121 
210 Section 298 of the SFO, which requires mens rea, provides for penalties of up to 10 
years imprisonment and/or a HK$10 million fine 
211 Section 277 of the SFO provides for sanctions able to be imposed by the Market 
Misconduct Tribunal that include director disqualification, disgorgement of profits, and 
costs orders 
212 Section 391 of the SFO provides for damages in respect of the pecuniary loss of 
investors acting or refraining to act in reliance on the information 
213 Save that section 298 is not relevant where the act was merely negligent 
214 Sections 277, 298 and 391 of the SFO 
215 Subject to carve-outs for persons who reproduce, re-transmit or broadcast the 
information in the ordinary course of their business 
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potential liability under these sections of the SFO, irrespective of whether the RF 
Report is regarded as comprising a credit rating or the Court of Appeal’s ruling.216  
 
The Tribunal does take issue with facts presented in the RF Report that appear to 
be in error and that are admitted by Moody’s although they have contended the 
errors are not material.217 That the RF Report was likely to induce transactions 
seems confirmed, at least when considered in the rearview mirror.  
 
The SFO also provides for remedies. Section 213 of the SFO can be invoked by 
the SFC where there has been, inter alia, a contravention of the SFO or any of the 
terms and conditions of any licence or registration under the SFO. It has been 
used by the SFC to obtain218 from the Court an order “to restore the parties to 
any transaction to the position in which they were before the transaction was 
entered into”.219 Given the substantial share price falls incurred, allegedly as a 
consequence of the report, in both the share and bond markets in respect of a 
number of companies the subject of the report, any restoration order would dwarf 
the HK$11 million regulatory fine currently imposed on Moody’s. However, there 
would be practical difficulties to apply section 213 in the Moody’s case.220  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 As the present case concerns a regulatory sanction of an administrative nature, there is 
nothing in principle that would prevent the SFC, or a private investor, from also bringing 
an action under the misinformation provisions 
217 Determination para 56. One commentator has suggested that the Moody’s report was 
only very marginally in error, suggesting it is only 1.2% wrong stating that only 12 flags 
were wrong out of 980 allocated. However, that is the wrong perspective - the correct 
approach requires a materiality assessment on a company-by-company basis 
218 The landmark case being SFC v Tiger Asia and Others [2013] HKCFA. 
219 Section 213(2)(b) of the SFO 
220 The Court would need to consider it desirable to make an order (Section 213(4) of the 
SFO). While determining the extent of restoration is always complicated in practice, the 
fact that the negative outliers identified by Moody’s have in fact performed poorly over a 5 
year period raises questions over what time horizon should be employed to measure loss 
(“4 of the 6 ‘negative outliers’ defaulting on their debts within 4 years, and the other 2 
having massively under-performed the stock market” – quoted from https://webb-
site.com/articles/moody.asp). To date, the Courts have applied section 213(2)(b) only to 
persons who have actually transacted with the wrongdoer as counterparty (i.e., before 
novation of the matched trade to the HKEx’s central counterparty), consistent with the 
general concept of unfair bargaining position. However, the language of the section is not 
specifically restricted in this manner and it remains open to the Court to apply the section 
to the benefit of other persons. (Requiring the counterparty element ignores the reality of 
anonymous trading and the randomised matching of orders undertaken by the stock 
exchange’s automated matching system, effectively making it a lucky draw as to which 
persons obtain the benefit of a restoration order against a wrongdoer. See S Johnstone, “A 
flawed debate” International Financial Law Review, May 2015, 38-39, p.38).  In September 
2014 the SFC commenced proceedings in the Court of First Instance (Against CITIC 
Limited (CITIC) and five of its former executive directors. See 
https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/doc?refNo=14PR108 (last accessed June 2016)) that may see a 
development in this regard - the SFC appears to be seeking restoration orders for persons 
who have merely traded during a specified period without appearing to require any 
counterparty requirement. While the Courts in Hong Kong have not as yet embraced an 
approach similar to the fraud on the market theory that has been adopted in the U.S. (For 
example: Peil v. Speiser 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-1161 (CA3 1986); Basic v Levinson U.S. 
Supreme Court 1988; Halliburton v Eric P John Fund U.S. Supreme Court 2014), this may 
soon change. If it does, this may have implications for other providers of information to 
the market, including Moody’s. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS ON CREDIT RATING 
 
Based on the effects of the RF Report in the market, the report appeared to be of 
considerable interest to both equity and debt investors. The environment of 
concern of regulators and investors over governance and accounting standards in 
Mainland companies, the targeted nature of the RF Report, the cautionary note of 
its red flags, and Moody’s status in the market, together contributed to this. 
 
Section 4 – an analysis of the statutory meaning of “credit rating” - represents 
one starting point for assessing whether the issuance of the RF Report constituted 
the provision of a credit rating. A close review of the statutory language suggests 
that it is not because the basic requirements of the statutory definition are not 
satisfied. (1) While the RF Report does discuss matters pertaining to credit risk it 
does not appear to be primarily concerned with creditworthiness (as such term is 
properly understood).221 (2) The red flag framework can be regarded as a defined 
ranking system but it lacks both the ordinality normally required of credit ratings 
and the ability to be used to meaningfully signify creditworthiness. (3) The 
language of the RF Report on a plain reading appears to eschew a connection 
between the red flag framework and creditworthiness. (4) The factors examined 
by the report may share commonalities with factors relevant to methodologies 
used by CRAs but no opinion on creditworthiness appears to have been 
expressed. Taken together, the foregoing does not point to a credit rating that is 
a defective one - it points to a report that is not a credit rating. 
 
Section 3 addressed another possible starting point for the assessment – the one 
taken by the Tribunal - looking outside the four sides of the RF Report as part of 
a purposive interpretation to give effect to the legislation. That approach takes as 
its focus the regulated activity of providing credit rating services. As regards the 
consideration of extrinsic matters, the CRA regulatory regime makes no provision 
to consider such matters. This notably stands in contrast to other provisions of 
the legislation that seek to attain similar objectives such as the quality of 
information in a market place and a clear delineation of regulated and 
unregulated activities. This suggests the Legislature did not intend extrinsic 
factors to be taken into account when determining the scope of the CRA 
regulatory regime. Section 5 above nevertheless considered the import of the 
press release. It was suggested that the press release does not materially alter 
the nature of the RF Report, in particular, that the single use of one phrase, 
“supplemental to”, is insufficient to do so. 
 
Section 6 considered the relationship between the Tribunal’s determination and 
the furthering of legislative intent. As noted in Section 1.3, although the 
Tribunal’s determination is technically incapable of affecting the law it is 
nevertheless highly influential as to how the SFC goes about executing its 
regulatory function as well as the undertakings of regulated persons. However, 
when the Court of Appeal rules on Moody’s appeal, law is established. It 
suggested that, should the Court of Appeal uphold the Tribunal’s approach, there 
may be consequences both domestically and internationally at odds with the 
policies and intent of the Legislature. 
 
Any analysis of information connected to the CRA industry must be astute to 
important differences between elements of credit risk, the methodology that is 
applied to a task, the concept of creditworthiness, and the opinion that might be 
expressed on creditworthiness. These distinctions underlie the fact that not all 
information issued by CRAs constitute credit ratings. Conflating them leads to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 See Section 4.2 above 
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muddled understanding of a CRA’s undertaking, a confused approach to the 
statutorily defined term “credit rating”, and consequential errors of analysis. 
 
It must also be informed by the overarching regulatory objectives of introducing 
CRA regulation. Locally, this includes ensuring ratings issued in Hong Kong meet 
international standards and are serviceable in the EU. A primary aim of regulating 
CRAs is to foster the reduction of information asymmetry among market 
participants. Potential developments that may tend to restrict a CRA’s function in 
that regard should be examined closely in view of that objective.   
 
Given that (1) the definitions of “credit rating” and Type 10 regulated activity are 
clearly expressed and as such appear to serve their regulatory purposes, (2) 
other provisions of the SFO adequately address the problem of misleading 
information entering the market, and (3) the potential problems attendant on the 
Tribunal’s approach, there does not appear to be any good reason to broaden 
their scope in the way undertaken by the Tribunal.   
 
Accordingly, the conclusion reached in this paper is that the issue of the RF 
Report and the red flag framework in it should not be regarded as constituting 
Type 10 regulated activity or a credit rating as such terms are defined by the law. 
 
8. THE REGULATORY APPROACH 
 
Setting aside the analysis and conclusions of this paper, it is worth considering 
some broader perspectives on the Moody’s case.  
 
When the new CRA regime was introduced CRAs were, in effect, to undertake the 
same activities as they had long been doing albeit under the new context of a 
regulatory environment in which their credit rating activities were to be overseen 
by a new regulator. At the time Moody’s issued the RF Report the CRA regulatory 
regime was only 41 days old. Of course, CRAs such as Moody’s were already well 
aware of the international developments since 2003 and had ample time and 
involvement in the development of the regulations in Hong Kong to be aware of 
their scope and requirements. Nevertheless, as discussed in Section 2.3 above, at 
that time there remained some lack of clarity in the market on how certain 
aspects of the SFC General Code would apply to CRAs. Teething troubles are not 
unusual in the introduction of any significant change in law or regulation. It 
seems not unreasonable to state that both regulator and regulatee were in the 
process of establishing and understanding the new relationship and how the 
details of the new regime would operate in practice. 
 
The SFC’s approach to the RF Report, electing to pursue Moody’s publicly under 
the CRA regime, is in some ways puzzling when one considers (1) the newness of 
the CRA regime, (2) that it required treating the issuance of the RF Report as 
being clearly a part of Moody’s Type 10 regulated activities and not merely a 
research report falling under a CRA’s other business analysis activities, (3) that 
no breaches of the more targeted SFC CRA Code were alleged and (4) the 
alternative approaches available to the SFC (assuming for this purpose the SFC’s 
perception of the RF Report). 
 
The matter could have been handled on a private reprimand basis. However, 
perhaps the SFC was of the view that such a sanction would have been 
inadequate. The SFC did consider the report to be misleading and, as understood 
through the lens of the Tribunal’s determination, appeared to consider it the 
cause of transactions having effects in the share and debt markets. One route 
therefore would have been to bring an action under the information based 
provisions of the SFO discussed in Section 6.2 above. As already noted, that 
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route remains open to the SFC irrespective of any regulatory sanction it applies 
under its disciplinary powers. One might ask whether, in the larger scheme of 
things, the RF Report was sufficiently egregious to warrant actions under those 
provisions. If it was, then why has action not yet been taken five years after the 
report was issued? 
 
Perhaps the RF Report did not clearly warrant that kind of action because it was 
not sufficiently offensive to market integrity or prejudicial to the interest of the 
investing public or public interest. Pursuing Moody’s through the Courts under the 
SFO provisions is also far more time consuming, expensive and ultimately 
uncertain as to its outcome. The SFC is under a statutory obligation to consider 
the efficient use of its resources.222 Given these considerations, an alternative is 
to approach the matter as a breach of regulatory codes. One might also note the 
potential effect a public sanction and fine could have on a newly regulated 
segment of the market, possibly reinforcing the message that CRAs were now 
subject to the SFC’s oversight - and disciplinary powers - and accordingly that 
CRAs would need to ensure they comply with the standards set out in the 
applicable SFC codes of conduct. This might also serve to foster the objectives of 
the CRA regime and promote market integrity at a time when the global financial 
crisis and the role of rating agencies was still very much a recent and highly 
sensitive issue. Regulators abroad, notably in the U.S., had also been subject to 
considerable criticisms for certain oversight failures in relation to the crisis. A 
decision to impose regulatory discipline might therefore serve a number of 
purposes. However, while the SFC’s disciplinary sanctions are rarely appealed to 
the Tribunal, and have never before been appealed beyond the Tribunal, they can 
be, as Moody’s have done. 
 
Effective regulation frequently comprises an element of seeking the right balance 
and making assessments as to the gravity of a perceived wrongdoing, and it is 
not the purpose of this paper to second-guess decisions made by the SFC that 
may rest on strategic, policy or other considerations. The RF Report is not free 
from errors and uncertainties. Nevertheless, with an eye on accepted regulatory 
values such as transparency and accountability (and putting aside the analysis 
presented in this paper), one can ask whether there was an alternative case for a 
more nuanced approach to a perceived shortfall in standards, managing the 
introduction of a new regulatory regime and effectively bringing an existing and 
well established industry within the SFC’s oversight. Law alone does not establish 
an effective regulator-regulatee relationship.  
 
In short, was pursuing Moody’s in the way the SFC did the best way of 
sanctioning Moody’s and/or promoting compliance amongst the CRA community? 
Is engaging a new group of licensees in common regulatory objectives, such as 
market integrity, more or less likely to be fostered through litigation, stronger 
discipline, or through other means? Certainly, it is widely understood that the 
prospect or fear of litigation or disciplinary disputes with a regulator rightly or 
wrongly often tends to restrict channels of communication rather than to facilitate 
them. To that extent, strategic partnerships between regulator and regulatee that 
work to foster market standards may be less likely to form. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Section 6(2)(e) of the SFO 
